The Emerging Normative Structures of Transnational Law: Non-State Enterprises in Polycentric Asymmetric Global Orders by Backer, Larry Cata
Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law
Volume 31 | Issue 1 Article 10
11-1-2016
The Emerging Normative Structures of
Transnational Law: Non-State Enterprises in
Polycentric Asymmetric Global Orders
Larry Cata Backer
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/jpl
Part of the Transnational Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brigham Young University
Journal of Public Law by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Larry Cata Backer, The Emerging Normative Structures of Transnational Law: Non-State Enterprises in Polycentric Asymmetric Global
Orders, 31 BYU J. Pub. L. 1 (2016).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/jpl/vol31/iss1/10
BACKER.MACRO.FINAL_2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/1/2017 6:23 PM 
 
1 
The Emerging Normative Structures of Transnational 
Law: Non-State Enterprises in Polycentric 
Asymmetric Global Orders 
Larry Catá Backer* 
ABSTRACT 
Globalization has produced a wealth of writing that seeks to theo-
rize the emerging relationships between states, non-state actors (espe-
cially multinational corporations), and international organizations. For 
lawyers, the relationship among these actors through law is especially 
meaningful. What has been emerging in recent years with greater clar-
ity is that while the formal structures of the organization of law and its 
relationship to the state system remains substantially unchanged, the 
realities on the ground have moved substantially away from these for-
mal structures. The traditional premises that have been used to justify 
and explain the relationships among states, non-state actors, interna-
tional organizations, law and governance no longer adequately either 
explain or justify the actual behaviors and outlooks of these actors. 
This essay considers the tension between the traditional premises of 
organizing governance (within and through states) and the emerging 
transnational legal order. The focus of examination is the corporation, 
which is where this tension is most evident. The analysis starts with 
the ideology of the state order, which disguises alternative governance 
orders and the governments through which they are operationalized. 
It is with the effects of the ideology of the state order that the analytical 
limitations of analysis become clearer, the object of Section II. Sections 
III and IV explore the power of ideology in framing analysis in the 
conception of the reality of self-constitutionalizing organization out-
side the state and in the theorizing of transnational law as method. 
Both suggest the ways in which the ideologies of framing analysis can 
color both the way in which relationships are understood and the ob-
jectives of analysis are formed. Section V then posits an alternative 
analysis, normatively autonomous (though not entirely free) of the or-
bit of the state, a vision possible only when the ideological presump-
tions of the state are suspended. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Our conceptions of the state—and of the character of the legiti-
macy of law as a product of domestic legal orders—have a profound 
effect on the way in which theorists, politicians, and lawyers are able 
to approach the identification of “problem” and offer “solutions.”1 The 
constitution of the state is often memorialized through documents or 
understanding of higher law that serves as a barrier between the state 
and others and between the higher order commands of that order and 
everything else that might constitute rules of behavior or authority to 
command. Gunther Frankenburg spoke of these constitutions as em-
bedded in and creating the space within which law, politics, economics 
and culture may function in a coherent and self-referencing space.2 
 
* W. Richard and Mary Eshelman Faculty Scholar & Professor of Law, Professor of International 
Affairs, Pennsylvania State University, and is the incoming chair of the Pennsylvania State Uni-
versity Faculty Senate. The author may be contacted at lcb911@gmail.com. The essay was orig-
inated in a Global Governance Debate of the Robert Schuman Centre’s Global Governance Pro-
gramme (European University Institute) with Professor Peer Zumbansen (Osgoode Hall, York 
University, Toronto, Canada) on the topic “Tension Between Public and Private Governance in 
the Emerging Transnational Legal Order,” Florence, Italy, April 16, 2012. My thanks to my 
research assistants Robert Marriott (PSU Law 2013) and Angelo Mancini (PSU Law expected 
2017) for their usual excellent contributions. 
 1.  There is an orthodoxy in matters of both the idea of the constitutional state and the 
structures for the expression of state power and control through law that is socialized especially 
in lawyers and those who perform services within and for government. “Never before has there 
been such demand from courts, lawyers and constitution-makers in a wide range of countries for 
comparative legal analysis. And never before has the field been so institutionalized . . . .” 
ROSALIND DIXON & TOM GINSBERG, Introduction, in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 1–17 (Tom Ginsberg & Rosalind Dixon eds., 2011). This orthodoxy extends to interna-
tional law as well, especially as it intertwines with orthodox consensus on the premises of the 
constitutional systems of domestic legal orders. “Proceeding from the concept of higher law, 
comparison has to deal with the related prescriptive aspects of constitutions as an instrument of 
governance and government allocating, balancing, and controlling political power, as well as a 
charter laying down the ground rules for social conflicts.” Gunter Frankenberg, Constitution as 
Law, Instrument and Culture, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 171, 
172 (Mauro Bussani & Ugo Mattei eds., 2012). And it is also a foundation for the self-conceptions 
of international law and order. See, e.g., ERNST B. HAAS, BEYOND THE NATION STATE: 
FUNCTIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION (1964); J. Samuel Barkin & Bruce 
Cronin, The State and the Nation: Changing Norms and the Rules of Sovereignty in Interna-
tional Relations, INT’L ORG., Winter 1994, at 107, 107–30 (1994). Its pedigree is long and quite 
selectively privileged to support the core notions that lend themselves to an understanding of the 
organization of power at the apex of which is the state, which expresses its most authoritative 
commands through law, including the law creating the administrative mechanisms that regulate 
the daily lives of legal objects. See, e.g., MICHAEL KEATING, PLURINATIONAL DEMOCRACY: 
STATELESS NATIONS IN A POST-SOVEREIGNTY ERA (2004). 
 2.  He explains: 
In tracing and mapping the development of modern constitutions, and with some ad-
ditional modeling, one may come up with four models defined by a distinct basic struc-
ture: constitution as contract (including social contract), manifesto, program, and 
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Michael Walzer3 speaks of the moral standing of states and of the 
moral presumptions from out of which the political order is founded. 
The state is constituted by the union of people and government, and 
it is the state that claims against all other states the twin rights of 
territorial integrity and political sovereignty. . . . It is, or it ought to 
be, determined instead by a morally necessary presumption: that 
there exists a certain “fit” between the community and its govern-
ment and that the state is “legitimate.” . . . So long as it stands, how-
ever, the boundaries of international society stand with it.4 
These structures of construction, in turn, serve as a proxy for a 
complex and deeply embedded ideology of politics—bound to blood 
and territory—that serves as the foundation of political, economic, so-
cial and cultural theory. That is, in fact, how “we” have been accultur-
ated to “see” and “abstract” the reality around “us” in the social space 
in which we interact. 
Yet, “‘constitution’ – like ‘nation,’ ‘state,’ ‘democracy’ and ‘sover-
eignty,’ – appears as one of the central icons and also one of the most 
ambiguous ideological structures in the pool of cultural representa-
tions of modernity.”5 These conceptions are at base the product of ap-
plied ideology.6 States often evidence their ruling ideologies in their 
core documents—constitutions, germinal judicial opinion, and the 
like.7 In the social sciences, including the academic study of law,8 the 
 
law. . . . One should not place too much weight, however, on this analogy, as these 
archetypes rather than elucidating a “constitutional unconscious” merely capture and 
shape the transnational flow of constitutional imagination and the practice it informs. 
Thus, the archetypes qualify as specimen for copies and variations. 
Gunter Frankenberg, Comparing Constitutions: Ideas, Ideals, and Ideology—Toward a Layered 
Narrative, INT’L J. CONST. L., July 2006, at 439, 451–59. 
 3.  Michael Walzer, The Moral Standing of States, PHIL. & PUB. AFF., Spring 1980, at 
209, 209–29. 
 4.  Id. at 212. 
 5.  Frankenberg, supra note 1, at 171. 
 6.  See LOUIS ALTHUSSER, LENIN AND PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS 85–126 (Ben 
Brewster trans., 2001); ROBERT PAUL RESCH, ALTHUSSER AND THE RENEWAL OF MARXIST 
SOCIAL THEORY passim (1992); Louis Althusser, Idéologie et appareils idéologiques d’État 
(Notes pour une recherche), LA PENSÉE 151 (1970).  
 7.  In China, see, for example, Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party (中国共产
党章程) (1969) (China), and State Constitution of 1982, as amended (中华人民共和国宪法) 
(1982) (China). In the United States, the U.S. Constitution and, for example, Marbury v. Madi-
son, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). In the U.K., among others, Magna Carta (1215) (England), the Bill of 
Rights of 1688 ch. 2, 1 Will. and Mar. Sess. 2 (1689), and the Act of Settlement, 12 & 13, Will. 
3 c. 2 (1701). 
 8.  For a germinal discussion, still relevant, see generally, LON L. FULLER, THE 
MORALITY OF LAW (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964); N.S. Timasheff, What is ‘Soci-
ology of Law’?, 43 AM. J. SOC. 225 (1937). See also Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Toward 
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role of ideology9—its deployment in the service of autonomous “fact” 
deeply camouflaged within the ideological presumptions of the sys-
tems in whose service they are deployed10—helps manage the frame-
work within which the conception of “what is possible/what is right”11 
is constrained.12 
This effect is particularly evident in the way in which it may be 
applied, without much thought for the effect of underlying ideology, 
to frame the very question for consideration in this essay. That ques-
tion will focus on the consequences of an emerging “tension” for set-
tled notions of connection between law systems and the state. This 
fundamental “tension” arose as the ideological premises on which the 
state system is organized are challenged by non-state actors. On one 
side stand a cluster of principles that tie the authenticity and legitimacy 
of law to its connection to the state, and that presume an identity be-
tween state and law.  On the other side stand a growing number of 
non-state actors that are developing increasingly robust functional le-
gal orders through which they operate that appear to destabilize the 
conceptual order on which the law-state relationship is maintained. 
That challenge arrays the premises and ideology of the state and the 
state system against two alternatives. The first is an emerging ideology 
of a non-state system whose organization, at its limits, might parallel 
that of the state system, but which exists beyond it.13 The second pre-
sents as against those two titans, that is of the state and the non-state 
actor as organizational centers of law systems, a novel edifice: an 
emerging recognition of self-constituting transnational legal orders.14 
 
a Sociology of the Juridical Field, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 805 (Richard Terdiman trans., 1987).  
 9.  Cf. Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. 
REV. 1276 (1984). 
 10.  See generally JUERGEN HABERMAS, KNOWLEDGE & HUMAN INTERESTS (Jeremy J. 
Shapiro trans., 1971). Cf. FLORIAN MENZ, Manipulating Strategies in Newspapers: A Program 
for Critical Linguistics, in LANGUAGE, POWER AND IDEOLOGY: STUDIES IN POLITICAL 
DISCOURSE 227–50 (Ruth Wodak ed., 1989). 
 11.  Brian Leiter provides an intriguing effort around ideology that itself, through its prof-
fer of legal positivism, tends to expose the underlying ideology of the search for a non-ideological 
concept of law. See Brian Leiter, Marx, Law, Ideology, Legal Positivism, 101 VIR. L. REV. 1179 
(2015). Cf. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Four Great Errors, in TWILIGHT OF THE IDOLS, OR, HOW 
TO PHILOSOPHIZE WITH A HAMMER (Duncan Large trans., 2009). 
 12.  See, e.g., GUNTHER TEUBNER, LAW AS AN AUTOPOIETIC SYSTEM (Blackwell 1993). 
 13.  See, e.g., GUNTHER TEUBNER, CONSTITUTIONAL FRAGMENTS: SOCIETAL 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND GLOBALIZATION (Martin Loughlin, John P. McCormick & Neil 
Walker eds., 2012). 
 14.  There has been a substantial amount of writing on this idea of regulatory systems 
beyond the traditional law-state nexus.  See, e.g., PAUL SCHIFF BERMAN, GLOBAL LEGAL 
PLURALISM: A JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW BEYOND BORDERS (2012); GRALF-PETER CALLIESS 
BACKER.MACRO.FINAL_2.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/1/2017  6:23 PM 
1]             The Emerging Normative Structures of Transnational Law 
5 
This conflict, and its contradictions, are having a profound effect on 
law—in concept and application.15 
Yet, currently, this very construction is possible only within the 
confines of the core presumptions of state ideology.16 These ideologi-
cal blinders perversely make it difficult to see fundamental shifts except 
within the premises and analytical constraints of that ideology. In this 
case it produces irony—the need to reshape reality to suit the ideolog-
ical predilections of a system increasingly real only in the past tense, 
producing a tendency toward false causation17 and conceptual confu-
sion.18 These presumptions bend the emerging realities into the struc-
tural presumptions of a global system grounded in the state as the 
highest form of coercive (and therefore political) power, legitimated 
by a set of presumptions about its use.19 It assumes the legitimacy of 
the hierarchy of power in which organizational and governance capac-
ity proceeds out from the state, delivered in appropriate form (law un-
dertaken within global Rechtsstaat principles)20 and exercised under 
the supervision of instrumentalities of the political or administrative 
 
& PEER ZUMBANSEN, ROUGH CONSENSUS AND RUNNING CODE: A THEORY OF 
TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE LAW (2010); TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS (Terence C. Halli-
day & Gregory Shaffer eds., 2016); Lawrence Friedman, Borders: On the Emerging Sociology 
of Transnational Law, 32 STAN. J. INT’L L. 65 (1996). 
 15.  “The nonchalance with which the emergence of the private supply of law has been 
endorsed is surprising. This is probably because, in the process of determining what constitutes 
law, excessive attention has been traditionally devoted to the recipients of a given rule, while scant 
attention has been paid to its suppliers.” Arianna Pretto-Saakmann, Private Suppliers of Law: 
Diversity for Lawmakers, 30 VT. L. REV. 921, 936 (2006). See Marc Amstutz, Métissage: On the 
Form of Law in World Society, in ZEITSCHRIFT FUR VERGLEICHENDE 
RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 336–60 (2013). 
 16.  See, e.g., Immanuel Wallerstein, The Inter-State Structure of the Modern World 
System, in INTERNATIONAL THEORY: POSITIVISM AND BEYOND 87–107 (Ken Booth et al. eds., 
1996); Yale H. Ferguson & Richard W. Mansbach, Political Space and Westphalian States in a 
World of Polities: Beyond Inside/Outside, 2 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 261, 261–87 (1996).  
 17.  Cf. Nietzsche, supra note 11.  
 18.  See, e.g., Nils Jansen & Ralf Michaels, Private Law Beyond the State?: Europeaniza-
tion, Globalization, Privatization, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 843, 843–90 (2006). 
 19.  See Larry Catá Backer, From Constitution to Constitutionalism: A Global Frame-
work for Legitimate Public Power Systems, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 671, 671–732 (2009).  
 20.  Sometimes Rechtsstaat notions are more myth than reality, gesture than substance, 
especially in the modern administrative state, where the connection between the polity and the 
sources of rules is tenuous at best. See Daniel R. Ernst, Ernst Freund, Felix Frankfurter and the 
American Rechtsstaat: A Transatlantic Shipwreck, 1894–1932, 23 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 171, 
171–88 (2009). Europeans understand this at the level of European Union law-politics as the 
democratic deficit. See, e.g., Kevin Featherstone, Jean Monnet and the ‘Democratic Deficit’ in 
the European Union, J. COMMON MKT. STUD., June 1994, at 149, 149–70. 
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branches of the state apparatus,21 or those of communities of states or-
ganized in international bureaucracies.22 
Such power can be ceded upward (to institutional creatures that 
aggregate collections of states international organizations)23 or down-
ward (into corporations or aggregations of civil society actors, religious 
organizations and the like that are understood to exist as a subordinate 
incarnation of the state).24 It is exercised through methods (contract, 
custom, and the like) that are, by their very definition, inferior in sta-
tus, form and effect to the forms (i.e. law, regulation, etc.) reserved to 
the state and exercisable only under the supervision of and vindicated 
through the judicial apparatus of the state.25 Indeed, in some cases, the 
state system finds intolerable the idea of assertions of governance 
power in aggregated form outside of the body of the corporate organ-
ization of the state itself.26 Consequently, all power falling outside of 
this framework can be suppressed as illegitimate and as a threat to the 
global social order. In a way that reflects the scientific development of 
“harmonious society” principles of Chinese political organization,27 
 
 21.  Criticized in NICO KRISCH, BEYOND CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE PLURALIST 
STRUCTURE OF POSTNATIONAL LAW (2010). 
 22.  See, e.g., JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS 
(2006); Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global Ad-
ministrative Law, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer/Autumn 2005, at 15. 
 23.  See, e.g., Armin von Bogdandy & Ingo Venzke, Beyond Dispute: International Judi-
cial Institutions as Lawmakers, in INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL LAWMAKING: ON PUBLIC 
AUTHORITY AND DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMATION IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 3, 3–33 (Armin von 
Bogdandy & Ingo Venzke eds., 2012); Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Why States Act 
Through Formal International Organizations, 42(1) J. CONFLICT RESOL. 3, 3–32 (1998). 
 24.  See, e.g., HARVEY FEIGENBAUM, CHRIS HAMNETT & JEFFREY R. HENIG, 
SHRINKING THE STATE: THE POLITICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF PRIVATIZATION 5–34 (1998); 
Saskia Sassen, The State and Globalization, in THE EMERGENCE OF PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN 
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 91–112 (Rodney Bruce Hall et al. eds., Cambridge 2002). For a criticism 
from the perspective of the protections of public law, see, for example, James M. Cooper, The 
Rise of Private Actors Along the U.S.-Mexico Border, 33 WIS. L.J. 470, 474–88, 502–10 (2015); 
Robert Koulish, Blackwater and the Privatization of Immigration Control, 20 ST. THOMAS L. 
REV. 462, 466–76 (2008); Tally Kritzman-Amir, Privatization and Delegation of State Authority 
in Asylum Systems, 5 L. & ETHICS OF HUM. RTS. 194, 194–215 (2011); Harold J. Sullivan, Pri-
vatization of Public Services: A Growing Threat to Constitutional Rights, 47 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 
461, 461–67 (1987). 
 25.  See, e.g., Larry Catá Backer, Multinational Corporations as Objects and Sources of 
Transnational Regulation, 14 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. 499, 499–523 (2008). 
 26.  See COOPERATIVAS Y SOCIALISMO: UNA MIRADA DESDE CUBA (Camila Piñeiro Har-
necker, ed., Editorial Caminos 2011). 
 27.  Harmonious Society, Seventeenth National Congress of the Communist Party of 
China, (Sept. 29, 2007), http://english.people.com.cn/90002/92169/92211/6274603.html; Larry 
Catá Backer, Studying the “Higher Law” of Scientific Development (科学发展观) in Chinese 
State-Party Constitutionalism, Law at the End of the Day (July 5, 2010), http://lcbacker-
blog.blogspot.com/2010/07/studying-higher-law-of-scientific.html.  
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the ideological presumptions of the state system permit the construc-
tion of a space for outlaw enterprises whose organization, methods and 
norms fall outside the law; that is, they fall outside the organizational 
parameters of hierarchy and control centered in the state.28 
It is in this constructing sense that much of the debate about the 
rise of governance orders outside of the state is framed. Its object is 
either to recognize the rise of such orders but then tame them within 
the hierarchical ordering systems of the state, or to identify their meth-
ods of governance and then seek to transform them, or vouch for them 
as law. Much like efforts to include marriage between people of the 
same sex within traditional marriage systems, the transnational gov-
ernance debate at times seems singularly focused on proving that such 
systems are either just like or compatible with the state system (some-
thing, for example, at the heart of recent efforts to incorporate rules 
for sovereign wealth funds)29 or that they can be made so by either 
broadening the current understanding of important terms—like law—
or characterizing these systems as somehow still attached to the state. 
The “tension,” then, which is usually identified as the heart of the 
conflicts both between state and private actors and among the two and 
the emerging “transnational system” (understood perhaps best in its 
methodological context),30 is grounded in the need to domesticate gov-
ernance rules outside the state, or to bring their methods more con-
ventionally within the methodological hierarchies of rulemaking. In 
either case, the state remains the supreme legitimating organization, 
and the law remains the most legitimate expression of binding author-
ity. At the heart of the tension is the issue of self-constitution.31 Within 
the presumptions of state ideology, self-constitution is impossible, ex-
cept as a political and perhaps religious act.32 All tension disappears 
 
 28.  Larry Catá Backer, The Drama Of Corporate Law: Narrator Between Policy And 
Law, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1111, 1146–64 (2009) (reviewing DAVID A. WESTBROOK, 
BETWEEN CITIZEN AND STATE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CORPORATION (2007)).  
 29.  Generally Accepted Principles and Practices: “Santiago Principles,” 
INTERNATIONAL WORKING GROUP OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS (Oct. 2008), 
http://www.iwg-swf.org/pubs/eng/santiagoprinciples.pdf.  
 30.  Cf. Peer Zumbansen, Why Global Law is Transnational: Remarks on the Symposium 
Around William Twining’s Montesquieu Lecture, 4 TRANSNAT’L LEGAL THEORY 463, 463–
475 (2013). 
 31.  Gunther Teubner, Fragmented Foundations: Societal Constitutionalism Beyond the 
Nation State, in THE TWILIGHT OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: DEMISE OR 
TRANSMUTATIONISM? (Petra Dobner & Martin Loughlin eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2010).  
 32.  Though even here, the autonomy of religion as against political acts remains in doubt. 
Consider in this context the furious effort to avoid recognition of some strains of Islam as too 
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when private and transnational systems bend their knee to the state, 
even as the state might be required to bend a bit, like the feudal French 
monarchs, in acknowledgment of the now ceded (and thus regularized) 
authority of its vassals. 
This essay considers the tension between public and private gov-
ernance in the emerging transnational legal order. The focus of exam-
ination is the corporation, where this tension is most evident. The 
analysis starts with the greatest structural impediment to the consider-
ation of the tension between public and private in the transnational 
ordering of the corporation—the ideology of the state order, which 
disguises alternative governance orders and the governments through 
which they are operationalized. It is with the effects of the ideology of 
the state order that the analytical limitations of analysis become 
clearer, which is the object of Section II. More importantly, the expo-
sure of the ideology of the state reveals the extent to which it can bend 
the objectives of analysis from one that follows reality on the ground 
to one that takes and bends that reality around the state. That bending 
can produce substantial effects on the structure of debate and the pos-
sibilities for understanding institutional changes in behavior that quite 
directly challenge the normative presumptions of the privileged ideol-
ogy. This effect can be exaggerated when changes appear to threaten 
the hierarchies built into governing ideologies. 
Sections III and IV explore the power of ideology in framing anal-
ysis in Gunther Teubner’s conception of the reality of self-constitu-
tionalizing organization outside the state and in Peer Zumbansen’s ex-
cellent theorizing of transnational law as a method. Both suggest the 
ways in which the ideologies of framing analysis can color both the way 
in which relationships are understood and the objectives of analysis are 
formed. Section V posits an alternative analysis, freer (though not en-
tirely free) of the orbit of the state, a vision possible only when the 
ideological presumptions of the state are suspended. It serves as a foun-
dation for a manifesto of law beyond nation and law.33 
 
violent or intolerant to be recognized as “legitimate” expressions of religious will. These ideo-
logical blinders were much in evidence as changes in religious expressions were conflated with 
Western political expression to change its complexion from religious to political expression. See, 
e.g., Peter W. Rodman, Policy Brief: Co-opt or Confront Fundamentalist Islam?, MIDDLE E. Q. 
(1994), http://www.meforum.org/201/policy-brief-co-opt-or-confront-fundamentalist.  
 33.  See Larry Catá Backer, Remarks made at the Launch Symposium of the Dickson 
Poon Transnational Law Institute, Transnational Law: What’s in a Name?, BEYOND NATION 
AND LAW: A MANIFESTO: BACKER-IN-LAW, http://www.backerinlaw.com/Site/wp-content/up-
loads/2016/05/BeyondNationLawManifesto.pdf.  
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II. THE IDEOLOGY OF THE STATE AND THE PROBLEM OF 
NON-STATE GOVERNANCE 
Gunther Teubner once asked: “after deconstruction, what is left of 
law as a hierarchy of rules, founded on a political constitution, en-
dowed with an institutional identity, based on the distinction between 
legislation and adjudication and legitimated through democratic rep-
resentation and constitutional rights?”34 He suggested that “should we 
search for it in the direction of a ‘polycontextual’ law that would not 
be hierarchical, but heterarchical, a law with multiple sources, a law 
without a unifying perspective, a law that is produced by different mu-
tually exclusive discourses in society?”35 Yet that poly-contextualism 
remains hidden under the veils of the presumptions of the ideologies 
that support the state system of political organization. But more im-
portant than the presumptions of state ideology are the methodologi-
cal techniques used to support them in a way that hides both their pres-
ence and the organizational priorities they represent. One of the great 
perversions of the 21st century is the merger of ideology and social 
scientism.36 This perversion arises in the way in which each hides its 
effects on the other, and that they together seek to present something 
that is both neutral and natural.37  
Ideology provides the cluster of basic assumptions and parameters 
that define the scope of reality—that is, they define the boundaries 
within which any sort of investigation, including social scientific inves-
tigations, may be organized. More importantly, it suggests the bound-
aries within which analysis of the data produced through the applica-
tion of social scientism can be understood, explained, and applied. 
Social scientism, much in vogue in most universities and among the 
social scientific disciplines, combines a mania for empiricism with an 
underlying absolute belief in the neutrality and unassailability of num-
bers. If some matter can be reduced to an equation—that is, to a set of 
 
 34.  Gunther Teubner, The King’s Many Bodies: The Self-Deconstruction of Law’s Hi-
erarchy, 31(4) L. & SOC’Y REV. 763, 763 (1997).  
 35.  Id. at 777. See also Gotthard Günther, Life as Poly-Contextuality, in Beiträge zur 
Grundlegung einer operationsfähigen Dialektik I. (Gotthard Günther ed., Harnburg: Meiner 
1976); Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The ‘Mystical Foundation of Authority,’ 11 Cardozo L. 
Rev. 920, 920–1046 (1990).  
 36.  There is a parallel discussion in the natural sciences as well. See, e.g., Austin L. 
Hughes, The Folly of Scientism, THE NEW ATLANTIS (Fall 2002), http://www.thenewatlan-
tis.com/publications/the-folly-of-scientism.  
 37.  For the germinal critique, see FRIEDRICH A. VON HAYEK, THE COUNTER-
REVOLUTION OF SCIENCE: STUDIES ON THE ABUSE OF REASON (Liberty Fund 1980) (1952). 
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mathematically arranged relationships—and if those relationships can 
then be illuminated through the substitution of numbers (serving as a 
proxy for reality) into the symbolic representation of relationships rep-
resented by the formula, then the resulting product must, in the social 
“scientist’s” mind, necessarily be reality. Combined, ideology and so-
cial scientism provide first the palette of assumption from which one 
can construct numerical relationships and then the numerical relation-
ships themselves that seem to prove the underlying ideological as-
sumptions on the basis of which the numerical relationships were pro-
duced in the first place. The inevitable tautology that is the product of 
this inherently powerful but circular reasoning tends to be hidden be-
cause the premises of social scientism in the service of ideology are 
never transparent. Assumptions in the construction of numerical rela-
tionships are crafted as second order propositions. Each is itself the 
inevitable choice that follows from the ideological framework from 
which an empirical study arises. As a consequence, it seems, social sci-
entism is built on the proposition that the thing can prove itself, with 
science providing merely a legitimating technique. 
This tautology and its ideology-enhancing character might be il-
lustrated with a small but telling example. The ideology of the state is 
currently pervasive. It posits that the state (and those multi-state enti-
ties, created by and which serve the interests of, states) is the highest 
expression of political will, and holds a monopoly of power over indi-
viduals and things. Though it may be constrained in the deployment 
of that power, such constraints merely emphasize the all-encompassing 
nature of state power. State power is evidenced by law that is itself both 
an object that can only be created by states and that cannot exist apart 
from the state. Law is accorded a singularly important place in the or-
dering and control of human and institutional behavior and is itself 
legitimated both from its relationship to the state and from the con-
formity of its creation to those rules which states have agreed serve as 
a marker of legitimate production (rule of law ideals). Yet states are not 
the only entities that create rules that bind people and other groups, 
and the state is not the only enterprise that produces rules that are 
obeyed. Even the absence of a state does not necessarily produce chaos 
or anarchy; that absence is measured against the ideal of the state.38 
Indeed, the ideology of the state requires that those rules be denomi-
nated by another name—both to distinguish them from the products 
 
 38.  Ken Menkhaus, Governance Without Government in Somalia: Spoilers, State Build-
ing and the Politics of Coping, INT’L SEC., Winter 2006/2007, at 74, 74–106.  
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of states and to situate them within a hierarchy of obedience that is 
meant to be somewhere below that of state produced “law.” Where 
there was a complete identity between territory and rulemaking, it was 
possible to maintain a working allegiance to this ideology without cre-
ating tension between ideology and reality. But in the face of globali-
zation, there are now spaces where the only rules that bind are those 
produced by groups and entities that are neither states nor other or-
gans of collective state power.39 Yet the ideology of the state produces 
in the social scientists, and the lawyer, a blindness to the consequences, 
where that blindness is necessary to preserve the power of the ideology 
to order reality. And so, in the service of the state, for example, social 
scientism may be called in to survey the paucity of law with respect to 
a particular governance area—grounding that survey on the distinc-
tions between the rule-products of states and other rules. The result 
will necessarily show both the paucity of law and the need to extend 
law to those governance areas where it is absent. But that conclusion 
must necessarily follow from the presumptions of state ideology that 
posit both the necessity of law and the basis for regulation and the rule 
of the state in the production of law. 
More importantly, perhaps, the ideology of the state also serves as 
a powerful force in the construction of taxonomies of rules that, in 
turn, serve to reinforce the ideological consequences of state suprem-
acy.40 The techniques of illegitimacy, devolution, management, mim-
icry and hybridity are usually deployed to contain or absorb behaviors 
that may be contrary to, or threaten, state ideology. Rules, other than 
those produced by states as law are, of necessity, incapable of serving 
their intended purpose and must be illegitimate.41 Their illegitimacy 
 
 39.  See, e.g., A. CLAIRE CUTLER, PRIVATE POWER AND GLOBAL AUTHORITY: 
TRANSNATIONAL MERCHANT LAW IN THE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY (2003) (“Today, 
forces of globalization and privatization are relocating the boundary between private and public 
authority in international commercial relations and creating new opportunities for private, cor-
porate actors to exercise power and influence.” Id., at 1). This is recognized even by international 
organizations, though in that case, efforts are made to keep these non-state zones quite con-
strained. See Larry Catá Backer, Corporate Social Responsibility in Weak Governance Zones, 
14 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 297 (2016). See also, Nicola Dalla Guarda, Governing the Ungov-
ernable: International Relations, Transnational Cybercrime Law, and the Post-Westphalian 
Regulatory State, 6 TRANSNAT’L LEGAL THEORY 211, 211–49 (2015). 
 40.  J.P. Nettl, The State as a Conceptual Vehicle, in THE STATE: CRITICAL CONCEPTS 
VOLUME: 1, 9–36 (John A. Hall ed., Routledge 1994). See also Accordance with International 
Law of Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 
I.C.J. 403 (July 22). 
 41.  Pierrick Le Goff, Global Law: A Legal Phenomenon Emerging from the Process of 
Globalization, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 119, 127–31 (2007). 
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derives, in part, from their failure to conform to the ideological requi-
sites for legitimate lawmaking. Alternatively, these rules are under-
stood as being devolved from the state—that is, they are a species of 
law precisely because the state permitted their operationalization 
within their respective territories through law.42 In another variation, 
rules are understood to be a necessary tool of the state in the manage-
ment of its operation.43 In this sense, rulemaking is not merely de-
volved (and as such serves as a species of law), but is also managed for 
the particular ends to which states may find useful. Markets are the 
best example of this form of ideological re-framing. Management also 
suggests yet another alternative technique of absorption into state ide-
ology—the notion of mimicry.44 Anything outside the framing as-
sumptions of state ideology are understood as legitimate, and meas-
ured by their conformity to the forms and practices of state-based law. 
Rule systems are constituted, rules are produced under rule of law 
frameworks, and—most importantly—rule systems constructed as le-
gitimate under the characterization of mimicry extend legitimacy to 
non-state systems to the extent of that mimicry. Mimicry itself can be 
understood as a process—it serves as a means of transition from outside 
to inside the ideology of the state. There is an element of the transitory 
in some governance literature, guided, to some extent, by the notion 
that private governance is a step towards the absorption of private gov-
ernance within the state system at the national or international level. 
Most positive views of soft law, for example, are premised on the as-
sumption that they serve as a way station to the construction of tradi-
tional and legitimate hard law, incorporated within the traditionally 
understood domestic legal orders of states. 
Lastly, and most hopefully, state ideology in its arguably most so-
phisticated form suggests that rule making outside the state forms an 
expressive component of a more complex hybrid system in which law 
is made from the interaction of rulemaking systems inside and outside 
the state.45 One form of this approach suggests hybridity through the 
 
 42.  See Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, The Empire’s New Clothes: Political 
Economy and the Fragmentation of International Law, 60 STAN. L. REV. 595, 619–26 (2007). 
 43.  See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: 
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 101–31 (1992) (putting forward the concept of 
enforced self-regulation in a complex interplay between the state as regulatory manager and in-
dustry). 
 44.  See Dara O’Rourke, Outsourcing Regulation: Analyzing Nongovernmental Systems 
of Labor Standards and Monitoring, 31 POL’Y STUD. J. 1, 1–29 (2003). 
 45.  See CALLIESS & ZUMBANSEN, supra note 14. 
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construction of public-private networks, where functionally differen-
tiated groups of actors with governance power informally organize 
themselves and then manage vertically oriented national governance 
through horizontal transnational networks.46 Sometimes these hybrid 
systems have an institutional component, focusing on the use of pub-
lic-private partnerships on an inter-governmental model of organiza-
tion and rule making.47 This provides a tentative step forward—the 
definition of law is expanded. But it also keeps one foot very much 
within the traditional ideological framework. The purpose of hybridity 
is to buttress “law” and to reinforce its hegemony.48 But law’s hegem-
ony also serves to reinforce hegemony of the state—it brings govern-
ance into law and therefore into the state.49 Yet there is a subversive 
element here as well—for just as a project to expand the definition of 
law into hybrid contexts can serve to discipline non-state rule making 
within the ideology of the state, so might it also serve to move beyond 
that ideology by detaching law from its firm anchorage within the 
state. If law can be hybridized, then it also might be applied to those 
organs of rulemaking that are not the state, and in so doing may attach 
law to non-state governments—like multi-national corporations.50 
Taxonomies are important not merely for producing an organiza-
tion of “things” that makes the world and the relationship among such 
“things” easier to order and understand. They also, by doing precisely 
what they were meant to do, produce the structures through which 
ideology can be applied and reified within the fact-producing universe 
of social scientism. Yet in doing so, they also expose the contingency 
of social science’s “facts.” And thus, the ultimate power of facts, in the 
form of relationships derived from data generation and proven by the 
reduction of behaviors to the accumulation of relational record keep-
ing, is not merely to reinforce ideology by masquerading as something 
 
 46.  ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 131–52 (2004).  
 47.  Larry Catá Backer, Private Actors and Public Governance Beyond the State: The 
Multinational Corporation, the Financial Stability Board, and the Global Governance Order, 
18(2) IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 751, 751–802 (2011).  
 48.  See Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther Teubner, Regime-Collisions: The Vain 
Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 999, 1017–45 
(2004). 
 49.  PRIVATE AUTHORITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (A. Claire Cutler et al. eds., 
St. U. of N.Y. Press, 1999). 
 50.  Larry Catá Backer, Governance Without Government: An Overview and Application 
of Interactions Between Law-State and Governance-Corporate Systems, in BEYOND 
TERRITORIALITY: TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL AUTHORITY IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 87 
(Gunther Handl et al. eds., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2012).  
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they are not—facts existing beyond the context of the knowledge struc-
tures through which they are produced—but in managing those who 
are the recipients of this information (politicians, lawyers, the public, 
technocrats, etc.). And that, of course, is the ultimate purpose not of 
data-driven social scientism, but of the ideology in the service of which 
such scientism is necessarily deployed.51 
Thus, consider the problem of the “fact” of the corporation. Some-
thing that is on its surface easy to discern becomes impossibly prob-
lematic once conflicting ideological structures are brought to bear on 
the question. If one were to adhere strictly to the ideology of the state, 
the corporation could not exist except as a reflection of the state. This 
is certainly the fundamental understanding in Stalinist and Maoist 
Marxist Leninism. The Cuban Marxists understand the corporation as 
the state in its form, but detached for use in particular purposes.52 In 
the West, this notion heavily influences the idea that corporations are 
no more than the receptacle of privileges given by the state in whose 
service they are to be used. This “fact” produces significant conse-
quences—from the judgment that corporations may have only such 
constitutional privileges as derived from constitutional rights-bearing 
beings (the idea commonly held in European human rights jurispru-
dence), or that such rights are limited to the protection of the property 
of such being held in corporate form (once an important measure in 
the United States), or that the corporation cannot be more than prop-
erty in the hands of its shareholders (a view still widely held in the 
United States). The ideological structure influences the focus of vision. 
So focused, social scientism can be deployed, for example in the form 
of so-called “Chicago School” or “Law and Economics” empiricism,53 
producing facts driven by and in the service of the ideological pre-
sumptions from which they derive. The same, of course, applies to the 
institutional ideologies of globalization that have recently provided a 
challenge to the state-based ideology of corporate organization.54 
 
 51.  Larry Catá Backer, Global Panopticism: States, Corporations and the Governance 
Effects of Monitoring Regimes, 15 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 101, 114–22 (2008).  
 52.  VI Congreso del Partido Cominiosta de Cuba, Lineamientos de la política económica 
y social del partido y la Revolución (April 18, 2011), https://www.scribd.com/doc/55084818/Fol-
leto-Lineamientos-VI-Congreso-Partido-Comunista-de-Cuba.  
 53.  See Robert P. Murphy, The Chicago School versus the Austrian School, MISES 
INSTITUTE (June 20, 2011), https://mises.org/library/chicago-school-versus-austrian-school. 
For a history, see, for example, Robin I. Mordfin & Marsha Ferziger Nagorsky, Chicago and 
Law and Economics: A History, THE RECORD: U. CHICAGO ALUMNI MAGAZINE (Fall 2011), 
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/alumni/magazine/fall11/lawandecon-history.  
 54.  JAN BROEKMAN & LARRY CATÁ BACKER, LAWYERS MAKING MEANING: THE 
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This is not to suggest that technique or methodology in social sci-
ences plays no useful role or that the equation-and-data driven rela-
tionships developed through empirical modeling are necessarily unre-
liable—or worse, inevitably misleading. Rather, it serves to emphasize 
the instrumental character of data-driven analysis, an instrumental 
character that is inevitable and inevitably tied to the presumptions of 
the ideology that data serves. If one starts from the assumption that 
states are the legitimate center of political power organized most legit-
imately as Western style participatory republics, then all data driven 
analysis will be driven by these premises—in the conceptualization of 
data that is relevant or significant, in the construction of posited rela-
tionships, and in the interpretation of the data that is recognized and 
then harvested. More importantly, it also serves as a reminder of the 
instrumental character of qualitative analysis of social science research. 
This is especially the case where one frames the question for analysis. 
Back, then, to the tautology tying norm and technique: ideology en-
sures that one frames the question in the appropriate way. Producing 
the right question is more important than extracting an answer from 
the wrong question. Where issues of governance and law are central—
framing the question to comport with ideological presumptions, that 
is, framing the discourse in a way in which the state remains at the 
center—it is difficult to escape the orbit of the state, even when the 
subject is the possibility of decentering the state itself. 
The connection between norm and technique serves to remind us 
of the need for caution in the use of these techniques and of their in-
herent limits. Empiricism produces knowledge of fact-as-fact; it pro-
vides a basis for understanding the character of a thing as “fact” in re-
lation to that to which it relates and from which it can be distinguished 
to some end (e.g., wheat-corn; red-white, flower-leaf, etc.). But facts 
are meaningless out of this relational context—that is, they cannot be 
identified usefully and are unknowable as “fact.” But usefulness is a 
matter of the ideological structures around which facts are developed 
(are two things ever identical? Two snowflakes versus two flakes of 
commercially produced cereal). Something does not rise to the con-
scious level of fact unless it is understood as such, and that understand-
ing is only possible within the reality-framing assumptions of ideology. 
To speak about “law” and the “state,” then, is to understand these 
 
SEMIOTICS OF LAW IN LEGAL EDUCATION II 155–80 (Springer, 2013). 
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terms within an ideological structure that situates and privileges cer-
tain constructions and not others; data-driven analysis that accepts the 
ideological premises of the state will necessarily not merely reproduce 
it, but will inevitably serve to strengthen its premises by the very ap-
plication of those premises in the service of data generation and inter-
pretation. While this is useful to answer questions such as whether the 
ideology remains useful, serves its ends, has deviated from its position 
and purpose, it serves less well to either identify or relate to facts and 
ideas outside of the ideological construct from which it arises. 
III. FROM GOVERNANCE BEYOND GOVERNMENT TO 
GOVERNMENT WITHOUT THE STATE 
Globalization has provided a governance framework environment 
marked by a fracturing and diffusing of power beyond political actors. 
Though the state remains very much alive and continues to be power-
ful within the ambit of its authority, its claim to a monopoly of gov-
ernance power—either directly or through public organs at the supra- 
or infra- national levels—is no longer plausible. This environment 
nurtures functionally differentiated communities of actors who to-
gether form closed self-regulating and autonomous governing systems 
that are not centered on any state, though perhaps are ultimately con-
nected to states. These are governance systems at the heart of what 
Gunther Teubner describes as polycentric globalization.55 This is not 
merely the sum of the privatization of governmental functions, com-
mon in assessments of polycentricity within the European Union gov-
ernance framework,56 but the substitution and/or supplementation of 
state authority by private organs, self-contained and self-referential, in 
which the state plays an incidental role. Prominent among these have 
 
 55.  Gunther Teubner, The Corporate Codes of Multinationals: Company Constitutions 
Beyond Corporate Governance and Co-Determination, in CONFLICT OF LAWS AND LAWS OF 
CONFLICT IN EUROPE AND BEYOND: PATTERNS OF SUPRANATIONAL AND TRANSNATIONAL 
JURIDIFICATION 203 (Rainer Nickel ed., Hart, Oxford 2009). 
 56.  Thus, it is not uncommon to “conceptualise the emerging field of European spatial 
policy discourse as an attempt to produce a new framework of spatialities—of regions within 
member states, transnational mega-regions, and the EU as a spatial entity—which disrupts the 
traditional territorial order, and destabilises spatialities within European member states. The new 
transnational orientation creates new territories of control, expressed through the new transna-
tional spatial vision of polycentricity and mobility.” OLE B. JENSEN & TIM RICHARDSON, 
MAKING EUROPEAN SPACE: MOBILITY, POWER AND TERRITORIAL IDENTITY 44 (2004). 
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been the rise of internally complete systems of operations of multina-
tional corporations and their suppliers.57 In an advanced form, they 
may even merge public and private actors within a system that is nei-
ther, in which an intimate and sustained interaction as equals produces 
something altogether different.58 Within this framework, even non-
state actors acquire recognition as entities burdened with public obli-
gations—for example, to observe international human right norms.59 
Significant in this respect are the current United Nations–sponsored 
efforts to “operational[ize]” a regulatory framework imposing a direct 
obligation on multinational corporations to respect human rights.60 
Governance authority has indeed leaked past the confines of the au-
thority of public organs and, now reconfigured, includes actors other 
than states. 
But has this nascent Umwertung aller Werte (“revaluation of all 
values”)61 of state power also produced a space within which govern-
ance is possible without government and, directly or indirectly, the 
state? Is it possible to point to systems of government that have 
achieved escape velocity from the state (and law systems) or even its 
proxies at the international level? Despite all of the great announce-
ments of the end of the state or of law as the basic organizing principle 
of power within a defined territory, the state remains at the center of 
most discussion of governance. Even if no longer necessarily the only 
source of authority, the state is not absent from even the most poly-
centric or state rejecting system advocated as an overcoming of that 
enterprise.62 In a simpler time (about a generation ago) the fictional 
divisions into which social, cultural and legal life were segmented were 
both simple and powerful methods for the organization of communal 
 
 57.  See Backer, supra note 25. 
 58.  Sovereign wealth funds provide a good example, the Norwegian Pension Fund 
Global, in particular. See Larry Catá Backer, Sovereign Investing and Markets-Based Transna-
tional Rule of Law Building: The Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Fund in Global Markets, 29 AM. 
U. INT’L L. REV. 1, 1–122 (2013). 
 59.  See Joint Statement to the UN Human Rights Council, World Bank and Other In-
ternational Financial Institutions Must Uphold Human Rights in all Activities They Support, 
GLOBAL INITIATIVE FOR ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS (Sept. 9, 2013), 
http://globalinitiative-escr.org/the-world-bank-and-other-international-financial-institutions-
must-uphold-human-rights-in-all-activities-they-support/.  
 60.  Human Rights Council Res. 26/9, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/26/9 (July 14, 2014). 
 61.  Friedrich Nietzsche, The Antichrist, in THE PORTABLE NIETZSCHE (Walter Kauf-
mann trans., Viking Press 1968) (1888). 
 62.  Inger-Johanne Sand, Polycontextuality as an Alternative to Constitutionalism, in 
TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 41–65 (Christian Joerges et al. 
eds., Hart Publishing 2004). 
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life. Demarcation was especially straightforward with respect to the 
construction and control of fictional persons, especially fictional actors 
organized for conducting economic activity. 
Like Athena, born fully formed from out of the head of Zeus, these 
juridical persons were said to be given form by the state, under whose 
rules these entities were “organized.” While some might argue that 
these corporate or entity charters gave these fictive entities life, it 
might be more useful to think of state charters as granting economic 
entities certain rights and obligations in the public sphere. These en-
tities exist in the form of their internal organization and connections 
among their principle stakeholders, but can claim the public rights of 
natural persons only to the extent that the public authorities permit it. 
In the absence of those permissions, these entities exist only as private 
arrangements (through contract) rather than as public juridical persons 
(through law). 
As the state served as the source of the public character of the en-
tity, only that law could be said to impose general obligations on the 
stakeholders intimately connected with the governance of the organi-
zation. Specific obligations, of course, remained a vital part of private 
law through contract. But these specific obligations gave no rights as 
against the entity to others. Nor was the corporation obligated to com-
ply with behavior norms with respect to its conduct or governance be-
yond those mandated by the state through law. All of this was in accord 
with the core of rechtsstaat notions and substantive constitutional law 
principles that flared out like a sort of legal supernova at the conclusion 
of the last World War in 1945. Moral obligations were consigned to 
marketing departments. Just as states had no obligation and little in-
centive to comply with hortatory international declarations, corpora-
tions and other juridical persons had little incentive to comply with 
norms that were not imposed by law, nor to acknowledge the power of 
purported stakeholders with no legal connection to the entity. Gov-
ernance, in effect, was firmly grounded in government. 
But this simple notion of state, law, and juridical persons, of gov-
ernance and government, has been undergoing substantial changes 
over the last quarter century.63 Governance is no longer purely the 
 
 63.  See Larry Catá Backer, Multinational Corporations, Transnational Law: The United 
Nation’s Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations as a Harbinger of Cor-
porate Social Responsibility in International Law, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 287, 308–27 
(2005). 
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province of government, though it has not abandoned the state en-
tirely. Contract, moral obligations, and communal consensus ex-
pressed in otherwise non-binding instruments have begun to assert a 
regulatory power far in excess of the extent of their formal effect in law 
within a system in which only legitimately enacted state measures are 
vested with a power to demand conformity and which may be enforced 
through the instrumentalities of the state. But this is a complicated 
process, messy and not clearly headed toward “success” in the conven-
tional sense.64 The regulation of the internet has been a well-known 
example, both in the context of national65 and transnational66 regula-
tion. The proliferation of private standard setting bodies is another.67 
Gunther Teubner recently reminded us of the complexity and ten-
tative nature of the process.68 Professor Teubner starts with a contra-
diction: the defeat of labor in its bid for formal and significant status 
as a corporate governance stakeholder through the German co-deter-
mination law by notions of corporate governance has not directed 
power back to shareholders or directors, but rather, in the form of cor-
porate codes, might have pushed power elsewhere “with a potential 
that is hard to gauge.”69 Teubner lays the blame for this contradiction 
on the dynamics of globalization. “A strategy in which the pressure 
amassed by worldwide social conflicts, protest movements, domestic 
courts, non-governmental and international organisations, coerces 
multinationals into adopting codes of conduct in which they assume an 
obligation to uphold social standards, is more likely to succeed.”70 
Yet this is an odd statement, for these codes have no legal effect, 
 
 64.  See, e.g., Larry Catá Backer, A Lex Mercatoria for Corporate Social Responsibility 
Codes Without the State?: On the Regulatory Character of Private Corporate Codes, 23 IND. J. 
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 1, ___ (2016). 
 65.  On national context, see, for example, Viktor Mayer-Schönberger & Malte Ziewitz, 
Jefferson Rebuffed: The United States And The Future of Internet Governance, 8 COLUM. SCI. 
& TECH. L. REV. 188, 188–228 (2007). For the contemporary debate, encryption provides an 
example.  
 66.  On transnational context, see LAURA DENARDIS, THE GLOBAL WAR FOR 
INTERNET GOVERNANCE (2014); JOHN MATHIASON, INTERNET GOVERNANCE: THE NEW 
FRONTIER OF GLOBAL INSTITUTIONS (2009); MILTON L. MUELLER, NETWORKS AND 
STATES: THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF INTERNET GOVERNANCE (2010). 
 67.  See, e.g., Harm Schepel, Constituting Private Governance Regimes: Standards Bod-
ies in American Law, in TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 161–88 
(Christian Joerges et al. eds., Hart Pub. 2004). 
 68.  Teubner, supra note 55. 
 69.  Id. at 1. 
 70.  Id.  
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except perhaps as contract (and in many places and under most cir-
cumstances even the contract model is a stretch). 
Legal aspects of the codes of conduct appear only at the periphery; 
that is to say, these codes occupy a juridical “no-man’s land”. As soft 
law, they are not enforceable; instead, they morally oblige companies. 
Everything depends on political relationships, namely, the pressure 
exerted by the leading actors and the mobilisation of the public.71 
Still, the contradictions of “soft law” that exhibit critical character-
istics of “hard” law require examination. And thus, Teubner proposes 
a thesis: “that corporate codes are emergent legal phenomena in the 
constitutionalisation of private governance regimes. Unlike when they 
were first spawned, they are no longer mere public relations strategies; 
instead, they have matured into genuine civil constitutions – in the 
fashion of constitutional pluralism.”72 Teubner advances five factors 
contributing to the evolution of soft law regimes, of governance with-
out government. These include what he calls, “(I) Juridification; (II) 
Constitutionalisation; (III) Judicialisation; (IV) Hybridisation; and (V) 
Intermeshing.”73What is not clear is whether these factors have pro-
duced governance without government—that is, the rise of fictive gov-
ernance that supports fictive entities beyond the control of the state 
(itself a fiction but one with quite a sting)— or whether it has produced 
a method for the rise of intergovernmental governance—that is, of 
public governance through private actors. 
Juridification suggests, for Teubner, the quite correct insight that 
the notion of soft law is itself no longer useful as either descriptor or 
concept. The notion essentially “beg[s] the same question as lex mer-
catoria, internet law and other global regimes in which private actors 
make rules, the binding nature of which is not guaranteed by state 
power, yet which display a high normative efficacy.”74 And here one 
comes to the great conundrum of transitions in law and the assump-
tions of legal regimes: global political systems worked so hard through 
two centuries from the time of the French Revolution to the destruc-
tion of the Nazi Regime in Germany, to cement the notion (in both 
higher law and statute) that under the rule of law, grounded in legiti-
mate state power, law assumes a central place as a legitimate expression 
of popular will, and popular will is the critical foundation for legitimate 
 
 71.  Id. at 2. 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Id. at 3. 
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action. But at the moment of its global triumph, this system of law 
appears upended by the semblance of law without the foundations in 
legitimacy. In short form—when academics and politicians, con-
fronted with the realities of governance through instruments like cor-
porate codes, ask what tends to be the standard question “is this law?,” 
they are signaling in shorthand a very different question: is this a legit-
imate expression of governance or merely a private arrangement of no 
interest as law? 
Teubner thus looks for another basis of legitimation, one “which 
self-perpetuates by recycling symbolic global (not national) validity. 
The first criterion, binary code, distinguishes global law from eco-
nomic and other social processes. The second criterion, global validity, 
differentiates between national and international legal phenomena.”75 
Still, Teubner concedes, not every code, or every expression of aspira-
tion, is worthy of the moniker law. He draws on Martin Herberg’s for-
malist construction (if it mimics law it may be law) approach.76 For-
malism, it seems, leads to functional effect, or at least to comfort, but 
not enough without a certain level of institutionalization. Law must 
not merely be complete, it must exist within a differentiated sphere in 
which its own autonomy is grounded in its own will. In other words, 
the juridical personality must assume the autonomy of that ultimate 
autonomous personality, the state, if it is to make law beyond that state. 
A ‘global law without a state’ should not yet be assumed upon the 
basis that non-state institutions judge behaviour pursuant to the nor-
mative code, but, rather, that it may be acknowledged only when pro-
cesses which observe these judicial functions under the binary legal 
code have been institutionalised. Only then do corporate codes sat-
isfy the structural pre-requisites of a transnational law outside of state 
law.77 
This requires juridification—a self-reflexive mechanism for en-
forcement and elaboration. 
This reflexive process requires certain institutional precautions, in 
particular, the development of actors or instances, who or which are 
responsible for the establishment, modification, interpretation and 
 
 75.  Id. 
 76. Id. at 3–4 (citing Martin Herberg, Private Authority, Global Governance and the Law: 
The Case of Environmental Self-Regulation, in MULTILEVEL GOVERNANCE OF GLOBAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE: PERSPECTIVES FROM SCIENCE, SOCIOLOGY AND THE LAW 146 
(Gerd Winter ed., Cambridge U. Press 2006)). 
 77.  Teubner, supra note 55, at 5.  
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implementation of the primary norm formation. Fundamental to this 
is the growth of the central level of internal control and implemen-
tation organs, which mediates between the two other normative lev-
els, thusly grounding the legal character of the corporate code.78 
Thus, the form of law may be contract—the essence of soft law in 
the 21st century79—but the function is regulatory within a contractu-
ally elaborated governance system.80 But juridification requires a 
higher law that can serve as framework both for regulation and as the 
process basis for a legitimate application of process rule of law. In other 
words, as Teubner elaborates, juridification requires constitutionaliza-
tion.81 However, for Teubner, “this occurs only when the reflexive 
processes in the organisations are appended to reflexive legal pro-
cesses—in other words, when inter-systemic linking institutions tie to-
gether secondary rule-making in the law with fundamental, rational 
principles of the organisation.”82 This idea of auto-constitutionaliza-
tion suggests that the “will to organization” of states, memorialized in 
constitutions, can migrate, and legitimately so, to non-state entities. 
This is based upon a constitutional concept which is not limited to 
nation states constitutions, but which, instead requires that, under 
particular historical conditions, even non-state civic orders give birth 
to autonomous constitutionalisation. The positivisation of constitu-
tional norms moves from the global political level to various social 
sectors, which, in parallel to political constitutions, produce their 
own constitutions of civil society.83 
The idea, increasingly accepted among international actors, is that 
constitutions of states are not too unique to states. Instead, any juridi-
cal person might also acquire a certain legitimacy as a regulatory entity 
by mimicking states. “We can observe the typical components of a con-
stitution: regulations about the establishment and functioning of deci-
sion-making processes (organisational and procedural rules), and the 
 
 78.  Id.  
 79.  Backer, supra note 25, at 499. 
 80.  See Larry Catá Backer, Economic Globalization and the Rise of Efficient Systems of 
Global Private Lawmaking: Wal-Mart as Global Legislator, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1739, 1774–83 
(2007). 
 81.  But not the other way around. This is well reasoned in GUNTHER TEUBNER, 
CONSTITUTIONAL FRAGMENTS: SOCIETAL CONSTITUTIONALISM AND GLOBALIZATION 
102–03 (Oxford, 2012) (and generally chapter 4–5). 
 82.  Teubner, supra note 55, at 5–6. 
 83.  Id.  
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codification of the boundaries of the organisation in relation to indi-
vidual freedoms and civil liberties (basic rights).”84 
But neither juridification nor constitutionalization are enough for 
more than “independent law-formation.”85 If this was all there was to 
the corporate codes of multinational entities, then the academic debate 
would center on whether these entities constitute new forms of states. 
That is an anachronistic position—suggesting a return to the age of 
the Hudson’s Bay Company and antique mercantilism, rather than to 
grasp the subtleties of the current movement. Teubner, though, sug-
gests the necessity of structural coupling86 with national systems. Mul-
tinational codes may be autonomous, but they exist in a networked 
community of law and power. States still control territory, and multi-
national corporations manifest their activity within territories. 
For the implementation success of codes of conduct, their judiciali-
sation in the national legal order will be one of the most important 
pre-requisites. At the same time, it should be clear that their recep-
tion in national law is not a condition of the legal character or binding 
effect of the codes.87 
For Teubner, the key still lies in globalization, but here understood 
as international judicialization. He explains: “The corporate codes are 
neither prescribed by national legislation, nor adopted, nor integrated. 
More pertinent is the notion of conflict of laws: the autonomous legal 
orders of the multinationals collide with national and international 
laws. In this collision between autonomous legal orders, both undergo 
a deep process of change.”88 What is described is not merely a process 
of communication, but of a pattern of exchange that is necessarily 
grounded on the autonomy of the actors. The coupling of these auton-
omous systems, their communication, is structural, that is built into 
their structures of autonomy and that structures the way in which they 
respond to the actions of other systems. 
Structural coupling is not merely communicative, or interactive, it 
is also dynamic: “there is a reciprocal reconstruction of the state law in 
the corporate code and vice versa.”89 When it rebounds, it changes all 
 
 84.  Id. at 7. 
 85.  Id. at 8. 
 86.  On structural coupling, see, for example, Anders Esmark, The Functional Differenti-
ation of Governance: Public Governance Beyond Hierarchy, Market and Networks, 87 PUB. 
ADMIN. 351, 351–70 (2009).  
 87.  Teubner, surpa note 55, at 8. 
 88.  Id. at 8. 
 89.  Id.  
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meta-system participants. But, of course, there is more to this. 
Teubner suggests within this notion a further layering of judicializa-
tion. This time, not in the service of the construction of an autono-
mous system, but instead as a meta-nexus point where structural cou-
pling or systemic interactions may be bureaucratized within a 
legitimacy-producing institution: 
Here, we are concerned with regime-transcending legal conflicts, 
with effects in both legal orders. The only escape route in such a case 
of inter-regime conflict would be for the tribunal concerned to de-
velop its own substantive norms. Mindful of the “domestic” and the 
“foreign” legal order, and with one eye on the third order, trans-in-
stitutional substantive norms, following the fashion of an asymmet-
rical law-mélange, could be formed.90 
This is certainly the framework that has emerged as the form of 
bureaucratization, par excellence, for legitimacy producing communi-
cation among systems above the state. In the West, the judge has again 
assumed the role as both Hebrew prophet and Greek oracle.91 “Thus, 
the most pressing task might be the organisation of mutual awareness 
and reciprocal acknowledgment between decentralised tribunals.”92 
Teubner has now moved us from the creation of a law-state con-
ventionally understood as derived from the state as the supreme legal 
person, to the possibility of the creation of governance-communities 
that are not states, but nevertheless acquire a legitimate form through 
constitutionalist organization and which exist autonomous of the state. 
But can the corporation, in the context of its great codification pro-
jects, pull away from the orbit of the state and its traditional law to 
become its own autonomous governance unit? There is always a dan-
ger, Teubner relates, that such codes will become little more than the 
privatized expression of public law.93 Already there is a great tendency 
among Western states to engage in privatized lawmaking.94 The 
boundaries of the public and private sphere are sometimes blurred, not 
 
 90.  Id. at 9.  
 91.  See Larry Catá Backer, Chroniclers in the Field of Cultural Production: Courts, Law 
and the Interpretive Process, 20 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 291, 315–38 (2000); Larry Catá 
Backer, Retaining Judicial Authority: A Preliminary Inquiry on the Dominion of Judges, 11 WM. 
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 117, 132–44 (2003). 
 92.  Teubner, surpa note 55, at 9. 
 93.  Id. at 9–10. 
 94.  On this point, see, GRALF-PETER CALLIESS & PEER ZUMBANSEN, ROUGH 
CONSENSUS AND RUNNING CODE, supra note 14, at 153–247. See also David V. Snyder, Private 
Lawmaking, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 371, 378–402 (2003); Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering, 97 
NW. U. L. REV. 319, 324–30 (2002). 
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at the insistence of power-seeking private juridical persons, but at the 
insistence of states that seek to privatize their governmental responsi-
bilities.95 These present a more discrete method of governance.96 
Instead, the hybridisation of the corporate codes is a developmental 
trend, in which the autonomy of the codes is preserved, but in which 
state agencies and international organisations are involved to the ex-
tent that they contribute to the delineation of the borders of the pri-
vate code and to its implementation and regulation.97 
Ironically, the success of this strategy might well serve as a barom-
eter of state power vis-a-vis their corporate regulatory competitors. 
Teubner, however, is not altogether optimistic about the ability of 
corporate code projects to reach escape velocity and detach from the 
orbital control of the states in which they operate. Or, more precisely, 
to reach that escape velocity in a way capable of being seen as legiti-
mate by competing governance organs. To work around this tension, 
Teubner suggests an approach grounded in what he calls “intermesh-
ing.”98 Intermeshing involves the Europeanization of multinational 
regulatory enterprises. Just as the Member States of the European Un-
ion together might create broader and more powerfully effective cross-
state norms, so too might multinational “states” do the same within 
cooperative regulatory communities. Thus, Teubner notes “the emer-
gence of inter-company networks as an extension of the corporate code 
onto an entire production network. Global commodity chains have de-
veloped, which constitute neither market relationships nor integrated 
multinationals.”99 These are “networks of independent companies, 
which have generated their own governance structures.”100 Here is the 
model of the European Union in a privatized variant form! 
Despite the audacious scope of his newly asserted path to legitima-
tion, Teubner ultimately remains tied to the state and its forms. In-
deed, one can see in the notion of intermeshing a three dimensional 
 
 95.  Cf. PAUL R. VERKUIL, Outsourcing the Duty to Govern, in GOVERNMENT BY 
CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 310–34 (Jody Freeman & Martha 
Minnow eds., Harvard Univ. Press 2009); Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Privatization, Prisons, Democracy 
and Human Rights: The Need to Extend the Province of Administrative Law, 12 IND. J. GLOBAL 
LEGAL STUD. 511 (2011); Fenner L. Stewart, The Corporation, New Governance, and the 
Power of the Publicization Narrative, 21(2) IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 513–51 (2014). 
 96.  See Larry Catá Backer, Surveillance and Control: Privatizing and Nationalizing Cor-
porate Monitoring After Sarbanes-Oxley, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 327, 410–27 (2004). 
 97.  Teubner, supra note 55 at 9. 
 98.  Id. at 2, 9–10. 
 99.  Id. at 9. 
 100.  Id. at 10. 
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model in which intermeshed inter-company networks align with inter-
meshed national regulatory structures.101 In so doing, he avoids the 
more interesting question of the possibility of communities of corpo-
rations (and other non-state actors), like the community of states, com-
ing together for the elaboration of governance frameworks that can 
exist autonomously. Yet Teubner’s argument can also be read to sug-
gest something novel in his concept of intermeshing: the intermeshing 
of networks of multinationals may create an autonomous framework 
of networked communities which themselves might communicate with 
autonomous networks of states. The networks themselves would give 
rise to governance frameworks that at some level suggest that of inter-
national organizations within the modern internationalized state sys-
tem.102 
The model of the state and the multinational as the basic and de-
fault binary foundation of analysis may no longer be as relevant as it 
once might have been. Just as multinationals have congregated within 
networks, so too have states. It is those functionally differentiated net-
works of states—either formally or informally constituted—that might 
best serve the interests of helping corporate codes reach escape veloc-
ity. Such a result is not the product of altruism, but instead might flow 
naturally from the value to groups of states of a consolidated and au-
tonomous community with which it might negotiate for more efficient 
global relationships. Here, globalization is a crucial factor. This con-
sequence suggests the construction of polycentric governance frame-
works in which the corporation might owe duties to states in which 
they operate (and within the political system of which they assume a 
subordinate role), and also simultaneously assume obligations under 
social norm systems generated by and generally applicable to the 
global community of corporations. We move then from Teubner’s 
state privileging universe—a universe in which the habits and forms of 
law-state systems are replicated—to a governance universe in which 
actors may acquire obligations and privileges grounded in the social-
norm frameworks of non-state regulatory communities, legitimated on 
 
 101.  The notion echoes the move toward regulatory governance but in a more complex 
setting. See, e.g., Udaibir S. Das et al., Does Regulatory Governance Matter for Financial System 
Stability? An Empirical Analysis, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (May 2004) at 1, 4–43 
(IMF Working Paper, WP/04/89).  
 102.  Consider the related notions of networked horizontal global governance groups, the 
structures of which have been elaborated by Anne Marie Slaughter. SLAUGHTER, A NEW 
WORLD ORDER, supra note 46; Candace Jones et al., A General Theory of Network Govern-
ance: Exchange Conditions and Social Mechanisms, 22 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 911, 911–45 (1997). 
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their own terms. These new actors take a variety of forms, from inter-
nally self-constituted multinational enterprise governance systems103 
to social norm systems grounded in the public obligations of private 
actors in international social norm systems.104 Li-Wen Lin has recently 
argued that these private transnational law systems might well leak into 
the law of host and home states as well, and as such, ought to be an 
object of comparative law study.105 
An excellent example of this was the work of the Business Leaders 
Initiative on Human Rights (BLIHR) through 2009.106 Initially, 
BLIHR developed a “tool box” consisting of several guides for busi-
nesses on human rights.107 These eventually were merged into a com-
prehensive guide developed in conjunction with the United Nations.108 
In addition, BLIHR promoted the human rights global governance of 
businesses by participating in the processes and submitting reports to 
the UN Special Representative on Business and Human Rights109 in 
the effort that produced the U.N. Guiding Principles for Business and 
 
 103.  See Larry Catá Backer, The Autonomous Global Corporation: On the Role of Or-
ganizational Law Beyond Asset Partitioning and Legal Personality, 41 TULSA L. REV. 541, 561–
70 (2006). See also Backer, supra note 80.  
 104.  See, e.g., John Ruggie (Special Representative on Human Rights), Promotion of all 
Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social & Cultural Rights, Including the Right to De-
velopment, U.N. G.A. A/HRC/11/13 (April 22, 2009). 
 105.  See Li-Wen Lin, Legal Transplants through Private Contracting: Codes of Vendor 
Conduct in Global Supply Chains as an Example, 57(3) AM. J. COMP. L. 711 (2009). 
 106. Legacy-Opening Memo, BUSINESS LEADERS INITIATIVES ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS,https://web.archive.org/web/20091020081739/http://www.blihr.org/ (last visited Sep. 
13, 2016) (“In 2003, we set out to find practical ways of implementing the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights in a business context. . . . The Business Leaders Initiative on Human Rights 
has been a business-led organization involving 16 of the world’s major brands during this pe-
riod.”). BLIHR ceased work in 2009. See Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, BLIJR, 
https://www.business-humanrights.org/company-policysteps/other/business-leaders-initiative-
on-human-rights-blihr (last visited Oct. 10, 2016). 
 107.  See Home Page, THE HUMAN RIGHTS MATRIX (June 24, 2010), http://www.human-
rights-matrix.net/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2016). It was developed in conjunction with John F. Sher-
man & Chip Pitts, Human Rights Corporate Accountability Guide: From Law to Norms to Val-
ues (Dec. 2008), http://www.humanrights-matrix.net/assets/Accountability_Guide_2008.pdf, 
and BLIHR, About The Guide, BUS. LEADERS INITIATIVE ON HUMAN RIGHTS http://www.in-
tegrating-humanrights.org/home.  
 108.  The Guide for Integrating Human Rights into Business Management, BUS. LEADERS 
INITIATIVE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.integrating-humanrights.org/home (in conjunc-
tion with the U.N. Global Compact and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuideHRBusinessen.pdf.  
 109.  John G. Ruggie, a professor at the JF Kennedy School of Government at Harvard. 
For the details of the collaborative work of Professor Ruggie as SRSG leading to the UNGP, see 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Human Rights and Transnational Corpora-
tions and Other Business Enterprises, OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/SRSGTransCorpIndex.aspx.  
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Human Rights.110 The organization bridged governance regimes 
through its appointment of individuals with substantial influence in 
multiple public and private governance sectors. Thus, Mary Robinson, 
former United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and 
President of Ireland, served as BLIHR honorary chair.111 In this com-
plex intermeshing, one can discern the development of consolidated 
norms within networked aggregations of privately constituted autono-
mous groups, negotiating for a harmonized set of regulatory standards 
at a supranational level. Indeed, BLIHR produced a set of toolkits and 
assessment tools that themselves complemented those that were spec-
ified in the United Nations Guiding Principles themselves. Together 
each constituted a set of soft law norms that could be taken up and 
hardened within the operations of enterprises that embraced them—
and they suggested, the societal obligations of the enterprises to do so 
in any case.  At this level, the public law versus private law distinction 
falls away as well. Sally Engle Merry has examined the way in which 
the mechanics of soft law systems—principally the toolkit and assess-
ment tools of organizations like BLIHR—solidify and harden soft law, 
at least within the enterprise.112 Such tools, she argued, increase the 
enforceability of soft law.113 Rule and technique merge in a context in 
which international norms are adopted as binding within the govern-
ance universe of corporate operations; soft law becomes hard within 
the internal governance frameworks of the enterprise and, thus inter-
nalized, the techniques of corporate management—contract, stand-
ards, internal policy, monitoring, and discipline—become central to 
 
 110.  See Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights for Implementing the UN 
“Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework (UN HR/PUB/11/04, 2011), 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf, en-
dorsed A/HRC/RES/17/4 (June 16, 2011), https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/G11/144/71/PDF/G1114471.pdf?OpenElement. The 
BLIHR were also instrumental in and by organizing international events, including the Decem-
ber 2008 International Seminar on Business and Human Rights held in Paris, France. 
 111.  See The Business Leaders Initiative on Human Rights (BLIHR), http://www.euro-
parl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/dv/blihr_/blihr_en.pdf. The interconnection 
among the individual actors thus married the institutional interconnections through which these 
projects were advanced.  
 112.  Sally Engle Merry, Firming Up Soft Law: The Impact of Indicators on Transnational 
Human Rights Legal Orders, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS, 373–74 (Terence Halliday 
& Gregory Shaffer eds., New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2015). 
 113.  Id. at 376 (but such measures also reduce the power of soft law “to articulate a broad 
vision of a just society.”). 
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the construction of rule systems derived from their constituting nor-
mative basis in international “soft law.”114 
Still, Teubner has suggested the skeleton of the constitution of 
governance without government and its elaboration in the form of cor-
porate codes. But that skeleton suggests more the methodology of the 
constitution of non-state states than it suggests the growing irrelevance 
of the traditional soft law, hard law binary distinction.115 In effect, the 
“harder” the regulatory institutionalization, the “harder” the govern-
ance produced, whatever its form.116 It is the constitution of govern-
ment without a state, rather than the deepening of governance without 
government, that is the real object of these constructions.117 
These temptations of governing ideology have a strong pull. It is 
especially powerful in unpacking the realities of autonomous govern-
ance outside the state within functionally differentiated organizations, 
like corporations (which legislate through contract and enforceable 
policy within its supply or value chain),118 and the meaning and effect 
of their self-constitution. That push and pull between the universes of 
state and of corporate governance is felt most acutely in some of the 
most path breaking work on the characteristics and objectives of trans-
national law, an interrogation of which suggests another layer of ten-
sion between public and private in transnationalism, one that seeks to 
deploy transnational law as either method or norm that might be used 
in the service of existing parameters of political organization favoring 
states and public organizations and disciplining non-state actors within 
that construct. 
 
 114. Policy Report 4, BUSINESS LEADERS INITIATIVE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, 
http://www.kajembren.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/BLIHR-4-Final-report1.pdf, (last 
visited Sep. 13, 2016) (“An important aspect of our work, especially over the last three years, has 
been to focus on the effective and productive integration of human rights into business manage-
ment systems: i.e. the ‘how’ as opposed to the ‘why’ or the ‘what’ of business and human rights.”). 
 115.  See, e.g., Gregory Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, Com-
plements and Antagonists in International Governance, 94 MINN. L. REV. 706, 765–98 (2010); 
Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54(3) 
INT’L ORG. 421 (2000).  
 116.  See, e.g., Birgitte Egelund Olsen & Karsten Engsig Sørensen, Strengthening the En-
forcement of CSR Guidelines: Finding a New Balance Between Hard Law and Soft Law, 41(1) 
LEGAL ISSUES OF ECON. INTEGRATION. 1, 9–35 (2014). There is a public law dimension as well. 
See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy Meyer, International Common Law: The Soft Law of 
International Tribunals, 9 CHI. J. INT’L. L. 515, 528–31 (2009). 
 117.  At its normative limit, see, for example, David Weissbrodt & Muria Kruger, Norms 
on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Re-
gard to Human Rights, 97(4) AM. J. INT’L L. 901, 912–20 (2003). 
 118.  See Backer, supra note 80. 
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IV. NEW FRONTIERS OF STRONGER BARRIERS AGAINST 
CHANGE—THE PROMISE OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 
That same tension, and the strength of the pull of the state, appears 
in Peer Zumbansen’s excellent theorizing about the nature of the 
emerging transnational law system. It is not uncommon to distinguish 
among foreign, international, and comparative law.  Most distinctions 
posit that the first is the study of the law of domestic legal systems not 
one’s own, the second focuses on the development of a legal order 
among states and other international actors that arises outside of do-
mestic legal orders (though interacting with and projecting power 
within it), and the third is the method by which the first, too, can be 
understood to engage in interactions with other systems. 
Comparative law, then, suggests the manner in which academics 
work through issues of structural coupling among any set of systems 
they are willing to couple and de-couple; for example, private law, con-
stitutional law, the regulation of enterprises, and the like. Comparative 
law is sometimes, then, understood as something in between—it has a 
function, to get from some point to another, but is not a field. Con-
sider the emphasis of the Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law,119 
the second part of which120 is devoted to a functional study of this busy-
ness: the eighteen approaches covered speak to a broad range of func-
tionality, but seem to avoid substance.121 
This approach has produced a certain amount of frustration. Ralf 
Michaels’s contribution suggests both complexities of the issue of 
method and the structuring of knowledge fields: 
The functional method has become both the mantra and the bête 
noire of comparative law. For its proponents it is the most, perhaps 
the only, fruitful method; to its opponents it represents everything 
bad about mainstream comparative law. The debate over the func-
tional method is indeed much more than a methodological dispute. 
It is the focal point of almost all discussions about the field of com-
parative law as a whole—centres versus peripheries of scholarly pro-
 
 119.  THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard 
Zimmermann eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2006). 
 120.  Id. at 305–869. 
 121.  Id. at Part II. (These functions without a field include comparative disciplines, func-
tionality, similarities and differences, legal families and comparative legal traditions, transplanta-
tion and reception, mixed legal systems, influence on national legal systems, Europeanization of 
private law, globalization, Islamic legal culture, African customary law, language, legal culture, 
religion, legal history, socio-legal studies, critical legal studies, and economic analysis of the law).  
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jects and interests, mainstream versus avant-garde, convergence ver-
sus pluralism, instrumentalism versus hermeneutics, technocracy 
versus culture, and so on.122 
What is missing for Michaels is greater methodological coherence. 
We should look at the functions and dysfunctions of the concept of 
function, including its latent functions, in the production of compar-
ative law knowledge. We should look at whether it is functional or 
dysfunctional, and we should see whether alternative proposals could 
serve as functional equivalents. This should enable us at the same 
time to start reconstructing the functional method as a constructive, 
interpretative, rather than positive enterprise, as a way of making 
sense of legal systems—constructing them as meaningful, instead of 
merely measuring them.123 
This may well produce useful movement toward the construction 
of a system124 that might in part serve as a framework for evaluating 
the law compared,125 and perhaps, for some, to invoke comparison in 
the service of legal unification.126 “Functionalist comparative law has 
not yet made sufficient use of the benefits of functionalism. This study 
can only hint at the possibilities, but its findings suggest that a more 
methodologically aware functionalism will provide us with better in-
sights into the functioning of law.”127 
This foundational issue of disciplinary self-conception has moved 
from comparative law to the emerging field of transnational law.128 In 
an excellent essay, Peer Zumbansen makes a strong case that transna-
tional law, like comparative law, is better understood as a methodology 
of law.129 
On the one hand, [transnational law] emerges as a series of contem-
plations about the form of legal regulation with regard to border-
crossing transactions and fact patterns transgressing jurisdictional 
 
 122.  Ralf Michaels, The Functional Method of Comparative Law, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 340 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., Ox-
ford Univ. Press 2006). 
 123.  Id. at 363 (citations omitted). 
 124.  Id. at 372–73.  
 125.  Id. at 373–76.  
 126.  Id. at 376–78. 
 127.  Id. at 381.  
 128.  PHILIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW 1–16 (1956). 
 129.  Peer Zumbansen, Transnational Law, Evolving, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW 899 (Jan Smits ed., 2006), reprinted in KING’S COLLEGE LONDON 
DICKSON POON SCHOOL OF LAW LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER SERIES: PAPER NO. 
2014–29 (2012). 
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boundaries that involve a mixture of public and private actors and 
norms. On the other hand, transnational law continues to evolve as a 
thought experiment in legal methodology and legal theory.130  
What follows, for Zumbansen, is “the recognition that transna-
tional law presents an important opportunity to reflect on law and its 
connections to ongoing investigations into local and global forms, in-
stitutions and processes of governance.”131 From this flows the critical 
contention that transnational law “invites a fundamental reflection on 
what is to be considered law.”132 As a consequence, transnational law, 
itself, sits in between—not law in the classical sense, nor the product 
of the domestic legal orders of states, nor the system of relations 
among traditional subjects of international law. But does this reduce 
the transnational to method? 
Zumbansen starts with transnational law’s origins in the middle of 
the last century. He notes its expansion as the global legal and eco-
nomic order changed in the aftermath of the construction by the vic-
torious Allies of the post-1945 global framework.133 The maturing of 
these investigations suggests two directions for transnational law. On 
the one hand, and like comparative law, it assumes a parasitical role—
“to spread out into different legal fields, in scholarship as well as in 
legal education.”134 On the other, transnational law has “matured in 
their conscious thematizing of the underlying methodological and 
conceptual challenges that arise from law’s embeddedness in a com-
prehensive, multi- and interdisciplinary discourse.”135 Enter globaliza-
tion. In the context of the opening up of governance in the wake of 
movements toward global freer movements of goods, capital, services, 
and to a lesser extent, labor, transnational law finds a space to evolve. 
Yet there is a sense that for transnational law to emerge as a field, some 
sort of unifying theory is necessary, one tied both to the forms of law 
and to its effectuation through the apparatus of government irremov-
ably tied to the state.136 In the absence of this conservative activity, 
transnational law, like its cousin comparative law, remains fit for 
method—and function—but not necessarily as a field apart from the 
 
 130.  Id. at 2. 
 131.  Id. at 3. 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  Id. at 1–3.  
 134.  Id. at 5. 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  See id. at 6–7. 
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fields of law, it either displaces or transforms.137 It is to those fields that 
Zumbansen then turns. Here is Zumbansen at his best; his discussion 
of the transnational element within these old fields might better sug-
gest not so much method as the construction of the field with its own 
methodology. To that end, Zumbansen examines lex mercatoria,138 
corporations,139 human rights and transnational anthropology,140 com-
parative constitutional law and transnational constitutionalism,141 ad-
ministrative law,142 and transnational human rights litigation.143 
Zumbansen ends with an examination of transnational legal his-
tory, societal memory,144 and transnational legal education.145 Of these, 
the last section on legal education is particularly insightful. Issues of 
field or methodology become most important when one is trying to 
organize knowledge for the purpose of teaching this to others, and of 
developing a vocabulary and reality framework that makes concepts 
understandable and useful. De-territorialization of legal education, at 
least within elite schools, has produced a dialectical process in which 
national traditions continue to shape education the content of which is 
increasingly unbounded by those very traditions.146 This is not merely 
a problem for shaping the relationship between teacher and student—
it is equally important for the shaping of academic communities and 
markets for knowledge. 
I suggest that Zumbansen sees the unifying methodological strands 
of the fields that retain their independence from each other even as 
they lose connection to states, the contours of which he masterfully 
examines. I wonder, though, if it is possible to see beyond the meth-
odology and over the barriers that separate traditional fields a set of 
substantive unifying elements that might illuminate the contours of the 
constitution of substance of transnational law as a field. Zumbansen 
deftly posits the form of the field. Yet it may be possible to define a 
field itself beyond a focus on utility. To move beyond field, as useful 
 
 137.  For a quite different perspective but along the same lines, see, for example, Mathias 
Reimann, From the Law of Nations to Transnational Law: Why We Need a New Basic Course 
for the International Curriculum, 22 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 397, 401–09 (2003). 
 138.  Zumbansen, supra note 129, at 7–8. 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  Id. at 8–10. 
 141.  Id. at 10–11. 
 142.  Id. at 11–13.  
 143.  Id. at 13–14. 
 144.  Id. at 14–15. 
 145.  Id. at 15–16. 
 146.  Id. at 17. 
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structure construction could serve as a means of making coherent the 
integrity of traditional fields by limiting them to their traditional bor-
ders, making room for other fields when the reality of action bursts out 
from the borders of the domestic legal orders the territorial limits of 
which used to supply field coherence. 
Zumbansen’s discussion of the transnational element in compara-
tive corporate law is instructive.147 Corporate governance is deeply em-
bedded at once in the domestic legal order of states and operates within 
a complex mix of transnational standards, guidelines, external and in-
ternal standards of conduct, monitoring, and transparency that center 
the corporation within polycentric governance frameworks that are at 
once public and private. This “de-territorialized production of norms 
is the radical challenge these processes pose for the way in which we 
distinguish between law proper and non-legal ‘norms’.”148 
But that is precisely the problem that the ideology of the state 
would posit—for inherent in this challenge is the presumption that the 
distinction between law and norm is important, and that the quality of 
obedience to law and norm within corporate governance is of a differ-
ent quality. And thus, the way this “feeds into a broader research in-
quiry”149 can be bent to the service of the state by positing question 
and answer in the context of rule of law based on law-state primacy 
(though it need not). For Zumbansen, though, this complex cocktail of 
public and private, of law and norm, of state and private government 
producing multiple simultaneously applicable rule structures that are 
harmonized within the internal operation of the enterprise,150 serves to 
illustrate the borders of the ideology within which the law-state oper-
ates and as well, “the way in which we begin to understand this emerg-
ing transnational regulatory framework as an illustration of contempo-
rary rule-making, the long-standing legal pluralist contention of 
formal and informal legal orders comes to be seen in a new light.”151 
Indeed, the construction of this seeming complexity still requires and 
 
 147.  Peer Zumbansen, Transnational Comparisons: Theory and Practice of Comparative 
Law as a Critique of Global Governance, in THEORY AND PRACTICE OF COMPARATIVE LAW 
193 (Maurice Adams & Jacco Bomhoff eds., 2012) (“What makes corporate governance such a 
promising example for the study of the prospects of comparative law, is the field’s enormous 
regulatory dynamism, which oscillates between national historical idiosyncrasies on the one hand 
and the extremely volatile impulses that it receives on a global scale, on the other.”).  
 148.  Id. at 194. 
 149.  Id.  
 150. Id. For a similar perspective, see Arthur R. Pinto, Globalization and the Study of Com-
parative Corporate Governance, 23 WIS. INT’L L. J. 477, 485–91, 497–503 (2005). 
 151.  Zumbansen, supra note 147, at 194.  
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relies upon the preservation of the sphere of law as separate and sepa-
rately legitimate, bound up in the distinction between “law and other 
spheres of culture.”152 
The object, then, is to bring governance outside the state within 
the normative universe of the ideological framework of the state—the 
method is through the expansion of the spectrum with a view to legal 
pluralism that “might help better understand the distinctly transna-
tional emergence of regulatory regimes.”153 This permits “us to study 
such regimes not as being entirely detached from national political and 
legal orders, but as both emerging from them and reaching beyond 
them.”154 But this produces recognition only of semi-autonomy of such 
systems—the pull of the state is strong. And it is in this semi-autonomy 
that the tension in public and private governance in emerging transna-
tional orders arises in the form of method, not norm—“represented in 
the tension between a ‘formal’ law and policy-making apparatus on the 
one hand and spontaneously evolving ‘informal’ norms in particular 
social contexts on the other.”155 
I have roughed out the possible contours of how a normatively co-
herent field of transnational law might be understood.156 It may con-
tribute another strand to what Zumbansen correctly describes as a his-
tory of a term, the variances of which “can be attributed mostly to the 
different doctrinal and theoretical backgrounds of those employing 
it.”157That suggests both the value of the methodological approach 
well theorized by Zumbansen, but also the normative framework 
within which methodology can be liberated from an unnecessary ser-
vice to state ideology. 
 
 152.  Id. at 194 (citing EUGEN EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE 
SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 486–508 (Walter L. Moll trans., Russell & Russell 1913) (1962)). 
 153.  Zumbansen, supra note 147, at 195. 
 154.  Id. 
 155.  Id. at 195 (citing Sally Falk Moore, Law and Social Change: The Semi-autonomous 
Field as an Appropriate Subject of Study, 7 L. & SOC’Y REV. 719 (1973)); Julia Black & David 
Rouch, The Development of Global Markets as Rule-makers: Engagement and Legitimacy, L. 
& FIN. MKTS. REV. 218 (2008). 
 156.  Larry Catá Backer, Principles of Transnational Law: The Foundations of an Emerg-
ing Field, LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY (March 9, 2007), http://lcbackerblog.blog-
spot.com/2007/03/principles-of-transnational-law.html. 
 157.  Zumbansen, supra note 129, at 6. 
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V. TOWARDS SELF-CONSTITUTING POLYCENTRIC GLOBAL 
ORDERS WITHOUT APOLOGY 
Zumbansen and Teubner have brought notions of governance 
without government a long way. They have pointed the way to con-
ceptualizations that detach governance from the state and de-center 
the state from webs of command that are regulatory but not conven-
tionally “law.” Yet neither author has suggested a thoroughgoing es-
cape from the orbit of the state. For both the state remains the touch-
stone, whether in form or in function. The state retains a strong power 
as the ideal against which other governance organizations must be 
measured, and sometimes around or with which a non-state system 
must orbit to obtain that measure of legitimacy that would vest a gov-
ernance minded non-state organization with the modicum of the au-
thority with which the state is vested. 
What started as a recognition of a changing reality—that states no 
longer entirely control the rule systems for the interactions among 
their citizens or residents158—has itself appeared to be moving toward 
organization with systemic qualities in its own right.  Transnational 
law represents a new and independent legal order, the concepts and 
contours of which remain highly contested.159 Already, some of its 
practices have suggested its transformative potential for the most fun-
damental ordering principles of the construction of the state and its 
basis in law.160 It points to the reconstitution of a global law that is 
 
 158.  See generally PHILIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW (Yale University Press, 
1956). 
 159.  See, e.g., Craig Scott, ‘Transnational Law’ as a Proto-Concept: Three Conceptions, 
10 GER. L. J. 859, 876 (2009).  
 160.  A number of scholars have begun to explore these possibilities from different perspec-
tives. See generally PAUL SCHIFF BERMAN, GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM: A JURISPRUDENCE OF 
LAW BEYOND BORDERS (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2012) (overlapping regulatory authority pro-
ducing hybridity); NICO KRISCH, BEYOND CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE PLURALIST 
STRUCTURE OF POSTNATIONAL LAW (Oxford 2011) (blurring of distinctions between national 
and international); GRALF-PETER CALLIESS & PEER ZUMBANSEN, ROUGH CONSENSUS AND 
RUNNING CODE: A THEORY OF TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE LAW (Hart, 2010) (transnational 
rule systems in and through private law); Ralf Michaels, The True Lex Mercatoria: Law Beyond 
the State, 14 IND. J. GLOB. L. STUD. 447 (2007) (private law as system beyond the state). 
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neither global nor ordered,161 and that breaks down the barriers be-
tween public and private in rule making and enforcement162 and be-
tween national judiciaries and processes.163 Is it possible, though, to 
flesh out the beginnings of a theory of transnational law that might 
provide a framework for escaping the orbit of the state, and the con-
straints of a process centered ideology?164 That requires a reconsider-
ation of the premises about the nature and institutional operation of 
law, an area of inquiry still very much beyond consensus.165 “If a useful 
model of transnational law could be devised—a working notion of what 
might link together social phenomena under this conceptual label—
perhaps the possibilities of relating together studies of transnational 
legal developments in seemingly disparate areas could be enhanced.”166 
In that light, consider the following version of a preliminary model: 
One starts with a fundamental premise: transnational law can be 
defined as the organizational law of non-state governance sys-
tems. These are the rules that make transnational rules and the insti-
tutional systems through which it is derived, and applied, authoritative, 
predictable and certain. They are the rules to define non-state govern-
ance systems and that can be enforced against them.  It serves as the 
operational shell of institutionalized systems of rules. The definition 
suggests both commonalities and differences between “transnational 
law” as a distinct legal field and conventional legal fields derived from 
 
 161.  See generally Larry Catá Backer, The Structural Characteristics of Global Law for 
the 21st Century: Fracture, Fluidity, Permeability, and Polycentricity, 17 TILBURG L. REV. 177–
199 (2012). 
 162.  On the privatization of lawmaking, see, e.g., Paul B. Stephen, Privatizing Interna-
tional Law, 97 VA. L. REV. 1573, 1593–1617 (2011); Daniela Caruso, Private Law and State-
Making in the Age of Globalization, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 29–59 (2006). There is an 
interesting wrinkle here as well—the subcontracting of lawmaking from administrative agencies 
to private parties.  See Kimberly N. Brown, Public Laws and Privcate Lawmakers, 93 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 615, 619–645 (2016). On the difference with privatization of function, see, e.g.,  
HERBERT WULF, INTERNATIONALIZING AND PRIVATIZING WAR AND PEACE 36–64 (Palgrave, 
2005); PAUL R. VERKUIL, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY: WHY PRIVATIZATION OF 
GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS THREATENS DEMOCRACY AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 1–
56 (2007) (critical of the movement toward privatization and outsourcing).  
 163.  See generally Maya Steinitz, Transnational Legal Process Theories, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF INT’L ADJUDICATION (Cesare P. R. Romano, Karen J. Alter, & Chrisanthi 
Avgerou Oxford, 2014). 
 164.  See Roger Cotterrell, What is Transnational Law? 37 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 500, 502–
04 (2012); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Why and How to Study ‘Transnational Law’, 1 U.C .IRVINE 
L. REV. 97, 109–11 (2011). 
 165.  See, e.g., Scott, supra note 159, at 876.  
 166.  Cotterrell, supra note 164, at 503.  
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the legal orders of nation-states. Like domestic law fields, transna-
tional law includes a constitutional element (a basic set of presumptive 
and supreme organizing principles and rules),167 a substantive element 
(implementing the constituted system),168 and a process element (rules 
for the development of substantive rules and dispute resolu-
tion).169 Unlike domestic legal orders, which are exercised through one 
specific institution (the state) transnational law covers a wide number 
of distinct governance communities existing simultaneously and orga-
nized beyond the rule-imposing power of states. Moreover, these gov-
ernance communities are not necessarily organized in the same way as 
states—with a population and a defined geographic territory and an 
institutional framework exercising plenary authority. Rather, transna-
tional law communities may be understood as functionally differenti-
ated communities organized for mutual benefit within specific objec-
tives.170 They can include groups, institutions, and networks. They can 
include religion as a governance institution in its own right as well. 
In one sense, then, transnational law can be understood as the 
study of the system of principles and rules applied either in lieu of or 
in addition to the domestically germane law of a state, or community 
of states, or to the relationships among persons and institutions—pub-
lic and private, natural and legal. It focuses on methodology and inter-
connectivity, on networks and intermeshing of systems in constant 
communication. Yet that does not provide much substance that is not 
 
 167.  Thus, for example, if one considered the International Monetary Fund as a transna-
tional governance order, one might look to the Articles of Agreement of the International Mon-
etary Fund to serve as its constituting document. See Articles of Agreement, INT’L MONETARY 
FUND, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/index.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2016) (adopted 
at the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference on July 22, 1944).  
 168.  One might understand the IMF’s policy determinations and the implementation of 
its obligations as the substantive element of its organization. See, e.g., Selected Decisions and 
Selected Documents of the IMF, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, https://www.imf.org/ex-
ternal/pubs/ft/sd/index.asp (last updated Dec. 31, 2013). 
 169.  One might consider the bylaws of the International Monetary Fund as its procedural 
architecture. See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, BY-LAWS RULES AND REGULATIONS 
(2016), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/bl/blcon.htm.  
 170.  On functional differentiation, see, e.g., Gunther Teubner, Societal Constitutionalism: 
Alternatives to State-Centered Constitutional Theory, in TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 3, 13–15 (Christian Joerges et al. eds., 2004); Niklas Luhmann, Opera-
tional Closure and Structural Coupling: The Differentiation of the Legal System, 13 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 1419, 1425–29 (1991). On the democratic deficiencies of such communal law producing 
groupings, see, Gráinne De Búrca, Developing Democracy Beyond the State, 46 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 221227-256 (2008); Oren Perez, Normative Creativity and Global Legal Plu-
ralism: Reflections on the Democratic Critique of Transnational Law, 10 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL 
STUD. 25, 42–52 (2003). 
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itself derivative or reflective of the state system and of law, convention-
ally conceived. It also suggests the danger that the definition of trans-
national law is so broad that it must embrace everyone and everything. 
In a better sense, then, transnational law might be understood as a law 
for the constitution of normative systems with binding effect or the 
constitutionalization of the societal sphere. From this constitutionali-
zation it is possible to consider the extent and nature of specific sub-
systems that may spring from it. “The question is now whether the 
integrative function of a constitution is of the same nature as the nor-
mative.”171 
Transnational law is tied neither to a state nor a single jurisdiction. 
No single person or entity controls the creation and regulation of 
transnational law.172 No one person or entity and no single institution 
controls transnational lawmaking, it might be understood as the emer-
gence of societies “organized by appetitive.”173 Transnational law is 
not dependent on a single lawgiver or regulator; it can be understood 
as a layering of law and rule systems the authority of which extends to 
objects subject to multiple regulatory regimes.174 Transnational law is 
thus the study of law that does not belong to or can be controlled by 
any single system of domestic or international law, as both have been 
 
 171.   DIETER GRIMM, INTEGRATION BY CONSTITUTION, 3 I·CON 192, 195 (2005); see 
also id. at 198–203 (preconditions for constitutional integration).  
 172.  See, e.g., GRALF-PETER CALLIESS & PEER ZUMBANSEN, ROUGH CONSENSUS AND 
RUNNING CODE: A THEORY OF TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE LAW (2010); Cf., Sigrid Quack, 
Legal Professionals and Transnational Law Making: A Case of Distributed Agency, 14 ORG. 643, 
643–66 (2007). 
 173.  DAVID A. WESTBROOK, CITY OF GOLD: AN APOLOGY FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM IN 
A TIME OF DISCONTENT 21, 38 (2004) (“Economic integration was intended to break the iden-
tity of geography, government, economics, culture, and emotion that too often engendered vio-
lent nationalism, and to create instead a new cosmopolitan situation, in which geography, gov-
ernment, economics, culture and emotion are polymorphously linked rather than conterminously 
arrayed.”). 
 174.  Its foundational essence, then, is essentially polycentric in a context in which every 
regulatory jurisdiction is limited and incapable in reaching to every aspect of a regulated object. 
John Ruggie understood this as a necessary consequence of the governance gaps at the heart of 
the challenge of regulating Transnational Corporations: “The overriding lesson I drew . . . was 
that a new regulatory dynamic was required under which public and private governance sys-
tems—corporate as well as civil—each come to add distinct value, compensate for one another’s 
weaknesses, and play mutually reinforcing roles . . . . International relations scholars call this 
“polycentric governance.”  
JOHN G. RUGGIE, JUST BUSINESS: MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
78 (2013). This layered governance and its reworking of the nature of state sovereignty in the 
international system of states is not unknown in public law. See ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA 
HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL 
REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 112–35 (1995). 
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traditionally constituted.175 Diffusion of regulatory authority is one 
key to understanding the structure of transnational lawmaking. An-
other key is functional differentiation of authority among a wide vari-
ety of political and nonpolitical communities.176 And it may also extend 
to the diffusion of the concepts on which law systems themselves are 
built—for example, concepts like the rule of law itself,177 which may 
constitute “a meta text for all transnational normative orders that speak 
to law, justice, or ‘regulation.’”178 The system of hierarchical and ver-
tically integrated regulatory systems grounded on the state as the pin-
nacle of lawmaking and on the community of states as the disciplinary 
mechanism for relations among states has been augmented by regula-
tory systems covering matters beyond the reach of any single 
state.179 Transnational law starts from the premise that law and law-
making are no longer the exclusive preserve of political states, or of the 
community of states.180 Transnational law posits that political commu-
nities no longer hold a monopoly on law making—that law systems are 
no longer grounded on an identity between law (or regulatory author-
ity) and the state (and the community of states).181 Autonomous supra-
national actors, private global actors, and communities grouped by 
function or affinity can, to some extent, produce regulatory systems 
understood to be transnational—even those that threaten the founda-
tions of the state order.182 
The transnational in law requires a reconsideration of law and its 
relationship to the state.183 Transnational law is neither a single or uni-
tary system of laws, rules and principles, nor necessarily systems that 
 
 175.  Menkel-Meadow, supra note 164, at 102–05. 
 176.  On functional differentiation of authority within systems, see, for example, Luhmann, 
supra note 170, at 1419. 
 177.  Jothie Rajah, ‘Rule of Law’ as Transnational Legal Order, in TRANSNATIONAL 
LEGAL ORDERS, 340–373 (Terence Halliday & Gregory Shaffer eds., New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015). 
 178.  Id. at 369. 
 179.  This produces substantial repercussions on conventional assumptions about the hier-
archy of law and its legitimation premises. See, e.g., Marie-Laure Djelica, From the Rule of Law 
to the Law of Rules, INT’L STUD. OF MGMT. AND ORG., Spring 2011, at 35, 35–61 (2011).  
 180.  See generally H. Patrick Glenn, A Transnational Concept of Law, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF LEGAL STUDIES 839–862 (Mark Tushnet & Peter Cane eds., Oxford, 2012). 
 181.  For an earlier intuition, see generally Detlev F. Vagts, The Multinational Enterprise: 
A New Challenge for Transnational Law, 83 HARV,. L. REV. 732, 732–92 (1970). 
 182.  See, e.g., Upendra Baxi, The Globalization of Fatwas Amidst the Terror Wars, in 
THE POWER OF LAW IN A TRANSNATIONAL WORLD: ANTHROPOLOGICAL ENQUIRIES 96–114 
(Franz von Benda-Beckmann et al. eds., Berghahn Books, 2009). 
 183.  See generally Roger Cotterrell, Transnational Communities and the Concept of Law, 
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mimic those of the state. Transnational law is not a unitary system of 
laws and rules analogous to the legal structure of a state, or the treaty 
and custom structure of the law of nations; it has no pretense to a sin-
gular global law that amalgamates the power of states for its 
own.184 Transnational law is an amalgam of rule systems, of hard and 
soft law, that are limited in scope, but effective within the scope of the 
authority of the rulemaking community, both autonomous and reflex-
ive.185 The key characteristic of transnational sub-systems is their func-
tional limits.186 Like classical federal systems, all transnational sub-sys-
tems are based on grants of limited and specific authority. These limits 
are defined sometimes by function (commercial law, investment, hu-
man rights) and sometimes by other factors (shared belief, citizenship 
in particular political communities and the like). The aggregation of 
sub-systems constitutes the field of transnational law. However, trans-
national law as a whole ought to be grounded in certain principles and 
rules that form the basic focus of any study of this field. Its founda-
tional premise rests on acceptance of the existence of a system of non-
national, supra-national or multi-national principles and rules applica-
ble, in accordance with its own terms and logic, to public and private 
actors, and natural and juridical persons. This system exists independ-
ent of the control or authority of any one state or of the community of 
states as a whole. 
Transnational law is structured in accordance with its own logic, 
quite apart from that which organizes the state.187 There are four char-
acteristics that form the basis of the study of the grounding rules and 
principles of transnational law and law-making: (1) scope of authority, 
 
21 RATIO JURIS 1, 1–18 (2008). 
 184.  See generally Bryan H. Druzin, Anarchy, Order, and Trade: A Structuralist Account 
of why a global Commercial Legal Order is emerging, 47 VAND. J.  TRANSNAT’L L. 1049 (2014) 
(analyzing the structural constraints on development of transnational governance orders beyond 
commercial law).  
 185.  See generally Gralf-Peter Calliess, Reflexive Transnational Law: The Privatization of 
Civil Law and the Civilization of Private Law, 23 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE 185, 
188–194 (2002). 
 186.  See Poul F. Kjear, The Metamorphosis of the Functional Synthesis: A Continental 
European Perspective on Governance, Law, and the Political in the Transnational Space, 2010 
WIS. L. REV. 489, 494-510 (2010). Cf. JESWALD W. SALACUSE, MAKING GLOBAL DEALS: 
NEGOTIATING IN THE INTERNATIONAL MARKETPLACE (1991). 
 187.  But see Peer Zumbansen, Defining the Space of Transnational Law: Legal Theory, 
Global Governance, and Legal Pluralism, 21 TRANSNAT’L. L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 305, 305 
(2012).  
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(2) institutional autonomy, (3) regulatory authority, and (4) effective-
ness of power to settle disputes. These have a constitutional element188 
as the organizing principles that give the regulatory community form 
and set its organizational boundaries. Such principles include the con-
stitution of a government apparatus and the rules for the operation of 
the governance power vested in this organization. They also have sub-
stantive and process elements. They include the rules, laws, and other 
norms that are produced or administered by the community and the 
process rules, through which they are applied, enforced, constructed 
and interpreted. Thus the substantive rules of transnational law sys-
tems ought to be distinguished from the “constituting” rules of a trans-
national system itself. The former has been the object of increasing 
study.  The latter has not. Yet it is the latter that is crucial for the 
emergence of the transnational as a “field” of “law” in its own right. 
“What—in the domestic  context—would,  for  example,  justify a  
strict  separation  between  labor  law  on  the  one  hand  and  corporate  
law,  on  the other? We should know and did already know for a long 
time . . . , that the justification of distinguishing between these two le-
gal fields, despite its ‘functional’ persuasiveness . . . , is at its core po-
litical[;] similar justificatory moves occur in both emerging and matur-
ing transnational  legal  fields.”189 
At the heart of self-constituting communities is an independence 
born of consent to join together for certain purposes.190 Functional 
differentiation rather than territorial differentiation marks the borders 
of the stateless government and governance beyond law. Autonomy 
presupposes an ability to distinguish the community from others, that 
 
 188.  On this possibility, from a variety of perspectives, some of them critical, see, for ex-
ample the approaches of Colin Scott et al., The Conceptual and Constitutional Challenge of 
Transnational Private Regulation, 38 J.L. & SOC’Y 1, 1–19 (2011); Vicki C. Jackson, Constitu-
tional Dialogue and Human Dignity: States and Transnational Constitutional Discourse, 65 
MONT. L. REV. 15 (2004); Lawrence M. Friedman, Borders: On the Emerging Sociology of 
Transnational Law, 32 STAN. J. INT’L L. 65 (1996). 
 189.  Peer Zumbansen, Law & Society and the Politics of Relevance: Facts  and  Field  
Boundaries  in ‘Transnational Legal Theory in Context,’ 11 NOFO (INTERDISCIPLINARY 
JOURNAL OF LAW AND JUSTICE) 1, 4–5 (2014), http://www.helsinki.fi/nofo/NoFo11Zumban-
sen.html. See also  Kaarlo Tuori,  Transnational Law: On legal Hybrids and Perspectivism, in 
TRANSNATIONAL LAW: RETHINKING EUROPEAN LAW AND LEGAL THINKING 11, 52 (Miguel 
Maduroi, Kaarloi Tuori, and Suvi Sankari, eds., 2014)  (“This is a major reason for legal hybrid-
ization at the level of fields of law; the emergence of new putative fields of law that confuse the 
time honored systematization.”). 
 190.  These autonomous orders occupy a variety of fields. For example, consider the emerg-
ing arbitral legal order discussed in EMMANUEL GAILLARD, LEGAL THEORY OF 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 38–46 (Martinus Nijhoff, 2010).  
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is, to define the characteristics that mark the community as distinct in 
the sense of permitting the regulation of its members. System auton-
omy permits the constitution of communities as self-referencing; these 
communities look to their own constituting norms as the source of the 
rules under which the community operates within the scope of its pur-
pose. The state does not serve this purpose. The authority to “legis-
late” additional rules from the organizing or constituting rules of the 
community, like the authority of legislatures to enact statutes consti-
tutionally permissible, suggests a regulatory authority that when com-
bined with autonomy creates the space for the governmentalization of 
non-state rule systems that operate outside of the territorial compe-
tences of states.191 An institutionalized system for making rules, devel-
oped from the framework adopted by a group, unified as a community 
and bounded by defined purposes, maintains its integrity through sys-
tems for the enforcement of its community and the rules developed for 
its management—as it does for the classical state through its bureau-
cracies.192 Transnational systems include methods for settling disputes 
among members and to maintain communal discipline. These tech-
niques can range from expulsion from the group193 to more elaborate 
systems of monitoring and disciplining based on quasi-judicial pro-
cesses maintained within the system or arising from out of it.194 
All transnational law systems share certain characteristics. Trans-
national law is not bound to the jurisdiction of any state. It is based on 
systems of partial and contingent regulatory authority; each regulatory 
system is dependent on others, to some extent, and yet is complete 
within the scope of its authority. Transnational legal systems are both 
horizontally and vertically integrated to some extent with each other 
and with domestic and international systems. The self-regulating cor-
 
 191.  On the possibility of shifting locations for authority, even authority relating to “legal-
ity,” see, generally, for example, the discussion in A. Claire Cutler, Locating “Authority” in the 
Global Political Economy, 43 INT’L STUD. Q. 59–81 (1999).  
 192.  See, e.g., Pierre Bourdieu, Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureau-
cratic World, SOC. THEORY, March 1994, at 1, 1–18 (Loic J. D. Wacquant & Samar Farage 
trans., 1994). 
 193.  See, e.g., The Ten Principles of the UN Global Compact, UNITED NATIONS 
GLOBAL COMPACT, https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/mission/principles (last vis-
ited Sept. 26, 2016). 
 194.  Larry Catá Backer, Apple, Inc, the FLA and the Governance of Supplier Labor Stand-
ards Beyond the State, LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY (Jan. 17, 2012), http://lcbackerblog.blog-
spot.com/2012/01/apple-inc-fla-and-governance-of.html.  
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poration evidences nicely the contours of governance without govern-
ment, or government without the state.195 It is also illustrative of the 
tensions of public and private governance in emerging transnational 
systems understood as a tension in the application of ideology in its 
legitimating function. We have seen that one of the greatest strengths 
of ideology is the way in which it can fade into the background, into 
the functioning apparatus of the state.196 What appears neutral may be 
little more than the expression of presumptions that constitute an ide-
ological framework for understanding and managing reality.197 Those 
presumptions then are unacknowledged as they operate in the back-
ground, as long as they are uncontested.198 Unremarkably, these pre-
sumptions create the background against which everything else is de-
veloped.199 Law, especially the science of law, is particularly susceptible 
to such management. Lawyers tend to be the servant of the law and 
legal systems. The lawyer’s craft is grounded in large part on the ability 
to absorb the governing ideology of a legal system and then deploy it 
in two ways: first, to preserve the integrity of the system in which the 
lawyer operates, and second, to use the rules of that system, consistent 
with its normative ideology, to serve the needs of those for whom the 
lawyer works.200 
Corporate law is no stranger to this phenomenon.201 Corporate 
law, more than other fields, seems strongly attached to the ideology of 
 
 195.  See Larry Catá Backer, The Autonomous Global Corporation: On the Role of Or-
ganizational Law Beyond Asset Partitioning and Legal Personality, 41 TULSA L. REV. 541, 561–
70 (2006). 
 196.  FRANK BURTON & PAT CARLEN, OFFICIAL DISCOURSE: ON DISCOURSE ANALYSIS, 
GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS, IDEOLOGY AND THE STATE (1979). 
 197.  This is particularly acute in the long running American argument over the societal 
and legal framework for managing its inter-racial relations. See, e.g., ANDREW KULL, THE 
COLOR BLIND CONSTITUTION 1–22 (1992) (race neutrality and anti-discrimination principles); 
contra Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution is Color Blind,” 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 62–
69 (1991).  
 198.  But even when exposed, they might be subsumed within the ideological contests that 
then protect the system from the revelations of its structural basis. Consider in that light the 
exposure of the agendas of power elites within a highly networked elite in the United States. C. 
WRIGHT MILLS, THE POWER ELITE (Galaxy Books, 1959). 
 199.  This was nicely developed in the case of European anti-Semitism in DANIEL JONAH 
GOLDHAGEN, HITLER’S WILLING EXECUTIONERS: ORDINARY GERMANS AND THE 
HOLOCAUST 27–79 (1996); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, GERMANY: DISCRIMINATION IN THE 
NAME OF NEUTRALITY: HEADSCARF BANS FOR TEACHERS AND CIVIL SERVANTS IN 
GERMANY 1–33 (2009). 
 200.  Cf. JAN M. BROEKMAN, & LARRY CATÁ BACKER, LAWYERS MAKING MEANING: 
THE SEMIOTICS OF LAW IN LEGAL EDUCATION II (2013). 
 201.  See, e.g., MICHAEL J. WHINCOP, AN ECONOMIC AND JURISPRUDENTIAL 
GENEALOGY OF CORPORATE LAW 196–220 (2001). 
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the state and state power.202 Though one might think that corporate 
law would be an odd site for the promotion of state and state-system 
ideology, a little thought suggests the strength of the tie between the 
normative foundations of corporate law and the normative basis of the 
state. That tie was brought home recently.203 The authors have found 
that European firms use the Societas Europea (SE) form to avoid man-
datory co-determination rules, but not necessarily to shop for the most 
favorable national corporate law to fill in gaps in SE regulation. The 
analysis is solid and the conclusions are strong. But what drew my at-
tention was the characterization of the behavior to be studied—what is 
commonly called legal arbitrage. In their review of the literature, the 
authors noted: 
Legal arbitrage can be defined as taking advantage of differences be-
tween legal regimes governing the same economic activities (or close 
substitutes). In the case of company law, legal arbitrage may occur 
especially when firms can choose to incorporate in different jurisdic-
tions without having to relocate their business activities. Corporate 
law arbitrage is a demand side precondition for charter competition 
among jurisdictions: if firms do not react to differences in company 
law, there is no point for jurisdictions in competing for incorpora-
tion. Legal arbitrage, therefore bears on the longstanding academic 
debate on charter competition.204 
The authors cite the greatly influential American authorities for 
the idea of competition between public regulators for corporate char-
ter business and the ensuing “race for the bottom” when states suffer 
the indignity of exposing their legislation to a market where exit is pos-
sible.205 
 
 202.  One acquires a sense of this as the essence of the corporate law is transposed—the 
essential connection between the management of capital aggregations, macro-economic concerns 
and the overarching authority of the state and its constitutive obligations are written into law. 
See generally Berbard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Reinforcing Model of Corporate Law, 
109 HARV. L. REV. 1911–82 (1996). 
 203.  See generally Horst Eidenmüller, Andreas Engert & Lars Hornuf, Incorporating Un-
der European Law: The Societas Europaea as a Vehicle for Legal Arbitrage, 10 EUR. BUS. ORG. 
REV. 1, 1–33 (2009).  
 204.  Id. at 3.  
 205.  See principally, William Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon 
Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 666, 696–700 (1974).  Yet the direction of the movement may go to 
the top rather than the bottom. See, generally Ralph K. Winter Jr., State Law, Shareholder Pro-
tection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 254-62 (1977). Its direction 
may also be indeterminate. See, generally, William Bratton, Corporate Law’s Race to Nowhere 
in Particular, 44 U. TORONTO L.J. 401, 402–03, 418–25 (1994). At least in the American context, 
it might be argued that this approach enhances shareholder value. See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE 
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The description is accurate, but it also veils a set of ideological pre-
sumptions that it embraces and advances through its analytical frame-
work.206 The first is that corporations must be governed by a single 
statutory framework. The second is that there is an optimal statutory 
framework that is (usually) connected in some way to the site of an 
entity’s center of operations. The third is that statutory competition 
(arbitrage) reduces the power of the state to assert policy objectives. 
These assumptions are in turn based on a more fundamental assump-
tion—that states stand at the center of the regulatory project as the 
privileged entity, whose authority and autonomy (especially regulatory 
autonomy to impose its will on all of its subjects) ought to be protected 
against incursions from non political actors operating within the terri-
tory of a given state. The focus of legal arbitrage is the state and its 
needs, rather than the corporation. The object of the study of corpo-
rate behavior is to ascertain whether they are behaving in ways that 
preserve the regulatory privilege of the state within a rule system, 
where states have some measure of responsibility for providing a basis 
for permitting the enhancement of shareholder value. But this ideol-
ogy is challenged by the reality on the ground in enterprise operations 
across borders—a reality that produces overall order within a set of 
shifting legal parameters that are themselves influenced by interna-
tional regulatory regimes.207 And it has produced the sort of govern-
ance gaps that have made international and private interventions nec-
essary.208 
However, if one assumes away the privileged position of the state, 
it is possible to think about what is called legal arbitrage in a substan-
tially different way.209 Globalization makes this possible in ways that 
would have been more difficult to conceive even a decade ago. In a 
world in which capital may be freely moved virtually everywhere, the 
 
GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 14–32, 37–44 (1993). 
 206.  Aspects of which are considered in SCOTT R. BOWMAN, THE MODERN 
CORPORATION AND AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT: LAW, POWER, AND IDEOLOGY 125–
84, 237–85 (1996). 
 207.  See, e.g., Franco Furger, Global Markets, New Games, New Rules: The Challenge 
of International Private Governance, in RULES AND NETWORKS: THE LEGAL CULTURE OF 
GLOBAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 201, 240 (Richard P. Appelbaum et al. eds., Hart, 2001) 
(private governance is “theoretically challenging because they suggest the possibility that con-
stellations of private actors can under certain conditions provide a variety of public goods and 
sustain rules, norms and standards without or with minimal intervention by nation-states”). 
 208.  See, e.g., RUGGIE, supra note 174. 
 209.  See, e.g., Robert C. Bird, Pathways of Legal Strategy, 14 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 
4–9 (2008). 
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state becomes a means for the production of capital, or, a cost to its 
production.  Those means and costs focus on the ability of the state to 
facilitate capital production through investment (its regulatory struc-
tures and its police powers to produce stability in its territory), and the 
costs include the price the state charges for its services (tax and regu-
latory costs).  From yet a different perspective, states produce regula-
tion that is then consumed by economic enterprises who must choose 
among these “rule commodities” in arranging their own operations to 
maximize their use in producing wealth. But laws are different in dif-
ferent states. Beside the cultural element, and perhaps the preference 
of its electorate,210 this reflects both that states are not equal in power 
and influence (even within their own territories),211 and that states may 
be subject to coercion from above—the consensus of international or-
ganizations to internationalize domestic law to different degrees,212 or 
from the consumers of regulation themselves.213 Corporations con-
sume regulation like they consume labor, capital and other items nec-
essary for their operation. Within this conceptual universe, regulatory 
markets can be understood to operate like other markets (labor, capi-
tal, consumer, etc.) though subject to their own peculiarities. The tra-
ditional object of lawyers and of jurisprudence has been to center a 
search for legal harmonization around the optimum set of conditions 
and structures that would move law from an object of consumption to 
a foundation for production.214 Legal arbitrage becomes something 
 
 210.  This is not an insignificant caveat. One can note that some states have used this notion 
of national characteristics as the central element of their lawmaking enterprise and their willing-
ness to resist internationalization, legalization, and judicialization of the international sphere with 
effects on their national territory. See RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S LONG MARCH 
TOWARD RULE OF LAW 55–124 (Cambridge 2002).  
 211.  See, e.g., STEPHAN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 184–219 
(1999). 
 212.  See, e.g., Claire Cutler, Human Rights Promotion through Transnational Investment 
Regimes: An International Political Economy Approach, 1(1) POLITICS AND GOVERNANCE 16, 
28–29 (2013); Larry Catá Backer, Private Actors and Public Governance Beyond the State: The 
Multinational Corporation, the Financial Stability Board and the Global Governance Order, 
18(2) IND. J. GLOB. L. STUD. 751, 782–800 (2011). 
 213.  See Joel P. Trachtman, International Regulatory Competition, Externalization, and 
Jurisdiction, 34 HARV. INT’L L.J. 47, 59–60 (1993) (“When a state self-consciously engages in 
regulatory competition, it recognizes that it is an economic institution that must compete in an 
open economic setting—that it must sacrifice or compromise domestic policy in order to achieve 
international economic policy goals.” Id. at 59).  In the context of globalization, see also, 
RICHARD FALK, PREDATORY GLOBALIZATION: A CRITIQUE 39–46 (1999); KENICHI OHMAE, 
THE END OF THE NATION-STATE: THE RISE OF REGIONAL ECONOMIES 117–40 (1996). 
 214.  For an excellent example, see CURTIS J. MILHAUPT & KATHERINA PISTOR, LAW 
AND CAPITALISM: WHAT CORPORATE CRISES REVEAL ABOUT LEGAL SYSTEMS AND 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AROUND THE WORLD 27 et seq. (2008).  
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less odd, focused on the corporation rather than the state and on in-
ternational standards rather than law.215 And its transnational element 
permits arbitrage not merely of law but of private standards as well.216 
Ideological lenses, especially those fixated on the superiority of the 
state system and its territorial principle (and presumption that for 
every entity there is a singular public regulatory home), can cause peo-
ple to see the same thing in substantially different ways. In the case of 
legal arbitrage or self-regulating corporations, the difference in vision 
is a function of the assumptions about the role of states and the state 
system in their relation to corporations. The “problem” of legal arbi-
trage is important where the preservation of a law hierarchy grounded 
in the state system is implicitly embraced. The opportunity presented 
by the self-regulating corporation is important where the state is sub-
sumed within a transnational regulatory space. 
From this ideological perspective, what might appear as soft law 
under the presumptions of state ideology takes on the characteristics 
of binding obligation. The inevitability of institutionalized inter-gov-
ernmentalism—the EU approach to dealing with extra-territorial gov-
ernance217—necessary under the logic of state ideology218 has had to 
make room for a different approach. This distinct approach is one 
grounded in the contractual and economic relationship of actors 
 
 215.  Hiram E. Chodosh & James R. Lisher II, International Arbitrage of Controversial 
Medical Technologies: An Introduction, 35 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 363, 364–65 (2003) (“Legal 
arbitrage is a variant of the economic practice. . . . Theoretically, arbitrage decisions may be made 
on the substantive law (or lack thereof) or the strength (or weakness) of the institutions respon-
sible for enforcing it.”). See generally the discussion in Anthony Ogus, Competition Between 
National Legal Systems: A Contribution of Economic Analysis To Comparative Law, 48 INT’L 
& COMP. L. Q. 405, 405–18 (1999); Neal D. Woods, Interstate Competition and Environmental 
Regulation: A Test of the Race-to-the-Bottom Thesis, 87 SOC. SCI. Q. 174 passim (2006). 
 216.  That has become the subject of certain legal regimes, for example food production, 
discussed in PRIVATE FOOD LAW: GOVERNING FOOD CHAINS THROUGH CONTRACT LAW, 
SELF-REGULATION, PRIVATE STANDARDS, AUDITS AND CERTIFICATION SCHEMES (Bernd 
van der Meulen ed., Wageningen Academic Publishers 2011).  See generally Khalid Nadvi, 
Global Standards, Global Governance and the Organization of Global Value Chains, 8 J. OF 
ECON. GEOGRAPHY 323, 323–43 (2008) (esp. Section 2); Benjamin Cashore, Graeme Auld & 
Deana Newsom, The United States’ Race to Certify Sustainable Forestry: Non-State Environ-
mental Governance and the Competition for Policy-Making Authority, 5 BUS. & POL. 219 pas-
sim (2003)(forestry).  
 217.  NEIL NUGENT, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
103–276 (Palgrave Macmillan 6th ed., 2006); Uwe Puetter, Europe’s Deliberative Intergovern-
mentalism: The Role of the Council and the European Council in EU Economic Governance, 
19 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 161, 161–78 (2012).  
 218.  Backer, supra note 80. The self-regulating corporation provides an example of the 
way in which ideology affects analysis and the assessment of the possibility of legitimately con-
stituted governments outside the state.  
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bound in sometimes complex systems, the rules for which increasingly 
arise in contract, in standards developed by transnational civil society 
actors and enforced through decisions of consumers and investors as 
much as arbitrators and communal actors serving in a decision-making 
capacity.219 But even intergovernmentalism has acquired a dimension 
in law beyond the law structures of domestic and international legal 
orders.220 This is not so much a new governance that focuses on the 
means of government and the expression of legality221 as it is a refram-
ing of government systemicity in which the state and its identity with 
law is de-centered.222 
Thus, just as lawmaking might have become unmoored from the 
state, the state has itself become unmoored.223 That unmooring sug-
gests more than the reconstitution of states within a more generalized 
public law based system, but also reconstitutes law beyond the state—
it becomes trans-national.224 It is in this context that the matter of cor-
porate citizenship225 serves as a proxy for the equally important con-
verse issue—that of the private rights of states as participants in global 
 
 219.  See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual 
Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21(1) J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 130–48 (1992) (esp. Section IV). 
For the classic study of the use of social norm systems to develop order within a self reflexive 
community, see ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE 
DISPUTES 123–267 (1991). 
 220.  See, e.g., Backer, supra note 47. 
 221.  See generally R.A.W. Rhodes, The New Governance: Governing Without Govern-
ment, 44 POL. STUD. 652–67 (1996). For the conversation about the “new governance” in its 
current form, see, for example, Orley Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the 
Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 344 (2004).  
 222.  See generally GRALF-PETER CALLIESS & PEER ZUMBANSEN, ROUGH CONSENSUS 
AND RUNNING CODE, supra note 14, at 96–152; Ken Conca, Old States in New Bottles?: The 
Hybridization of Authority in Global Environmental Governance, in THE STATE AND THE 
GLOBAL ECOLOGICAL CRISIS 181 (John Barry & Robyn Eckersley eds., 2005). 
 223.  See, e.g., DENNIS PATTERSON & ARI AFIALO, THE NEW GLOBAL TRADING 
ORDER: THE EVOLVING STATE AND THE FUTURE OF TRADE 11–40 (2008). 
 224.  This suggests a more robust autonomy than the concept of separateness, of derivative 
character of law and governance less attached to the state, might otherwise suggest. See, e.g., 
PHILIP ALLOTT, THE HEALTH OF NATIONS: SOCIETY AND LAW BEYOND THE STATE 36–67 
(2002). For other consideration of law autonomy from the state in a number of variations, see, 
for example, ROBERT MCCORQUODALE, INTERNATIONAL LAW BEYOND THE STATE: ESSAYS 
ON SOVEREIGNTY, NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2011) (Part II essays); PAUL 
SCHIFF BERMAN, GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM: A JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW BEYOND BORDERS 
23–60 (2012); GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND EU ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: 
RELATIONSHIPS, LEGAL ISSUES AND COMPARISON (Edoardo Chiti & Bernardo Giorgio Mat-
tarella eds., Springer 2011) (esp. Part III essays). 
 225.  See, e.g., GRAHAME E. THOMPSON, THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE 
GLOBAL CORPORATE SPHERE? 53–98 (2012); Teubner, supra note 13, at 156.  
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markets.226 At the international level, states and other collectives might 
well have to meet more as equals, even as they interact within vertical 
hierarchies in particular contexts.227 But even those localized hierar-
chies are now unstable. Corporations negotiate “agreements” with 
states in organizing their production chains,228 non-state actors de-
velop standards to regulate global production,229 and nations negotiate 
treaties that export their internal governance.230 Large corporations 
can coerce small states in ways that mimic the ways in which larger 
states can do the same to smaller and more vulnerable ones. States and 
corporations are now capable of deploying forces in the field—some-
times states hire corporations that serve as mercenary armies231 that 
protect its own operations as well as those of the institutions of the 
state from sub-national and supra-state threats.232 The clear lines of 
 
 226.  See generally Hao Liang, Bing Ren, & Sunny Li Sun, An anatomy of state control in 
the globalization of state-owned enterprises, 46 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 223, 223–40 (2015); Larry 
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ternational Law, 17(3) EUR. J. INT’L L. 675 (2006). 
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ENTERPRISES AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 665–705 (2d ed. 2008). 
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44–72 (Walter Mattli & Ngaire Woods eds., 2009). 
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Theory of ‘Unequal Treaties’ in Contemporary International Law, 38 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 465, 
493–98 (2016); Tom Ginsburg, International Substitutes for Domestic Institutions: Bilateral In-
vestment Treaties and Governance, 25 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 107, 118–22 (2005); Andrew T. 
Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 639, 672–73 (1998). 
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97–104 (2015); Daphné Richemond-Barak, Rethinking Private Warfare, 5 LAW & ETHICS HUM. 
RTS. 159, 169–74 (2011); FROM MERCENARIES TO MARKET: THE RISE AND REGULATION OF 
PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES (Simon Chesterman & Chia Lehnardt eds., Oxford 2007) (see 
especially the introduction to these essays at 1–10). 
 232.  See generally Jose L. Gómez del Prado, A United Nations Instrument to Regulate 
and Monitor Private Military and Security Contractors, NOTRE DAME  J. INT’L, COMP. & H.R. 
L. 1, 4–23  (2011); Lawrence W. Serewicz, Globalization, Sovereignty and the Military Revolu-
tion: From Mercenaries to Private International Security Companies, 39 INT’L POL. 75 passim 
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public and private authority, and even the once clear lines of its Marx-
ist-Leninist opposite, have become blurred.233 In that context, consti-
tutionalism and the constitutionalization of governance have become 
more complex concepts.234 More importantly, the range and capacity 
of players has substantially increased as well. 
It is in this context that it is possible to conceive of the transna-
tional as a normative construct. That is, to see the transnational as 
something more than a process for filling governance gap, or an invi-
tation to multilateralism or a methodological trope—and in this later 
construction one with all of the ambiguous eddies of comparative 
law.235 It is that reality that is emerging from a better view of changes 
on the ground in this century that no longer conform comfortably to 
the ideologies on which our systems were constructed in the last cen-
tury.  And it is that reality that may drive scholars, and the elites who 
order the world, toward a new understanding that the governance sys-
tems they are operating are transnational in both a normative and a 
process sense. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In 1927, the American philosopher John Dewy considered the 
problem of the state.236 He suggested, well before world warfare and 
globalization changed the realities of the state within the web of power 
relationships that mark the 21st century, that “[t]here is no more an 
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inherent sanctity in a church, trade union, business corporation, or 
family institution than there is in the State. Their value is also to be 
measured by their consequences. The consequences vary with concrete 
conditions. . .”237 Globalization has made possible the realization of 
this insight in ways that Dewey could never have predicted. We have 
been moving from the recognition of the possibility of governance 
without government, to that of the reality of government without the 
state. Part of the difficulty of that recognition has been the ideological 
blinders created by a continuing adherence to state ideology as an or-
dering structure of reality for purposes of analysis. But another part is 
made up of both habit and nostalgia for the idea of the state (as the 
only possible legitimate foundation for human political organization) 
that manages, in turn, economic, social and cultural life. The resulting 
tension between public and private governance in the emerging trans-
national legal order, then, is best understood as the consequence of the 
emergence of a peculiar governance system.  That system, though net-
worked with and operating in the same spaces as the state, has not nec-
essarily embedded in either the normative ordering framework of the 
state system or the state ideology that provides authority for that as-
sertion of power.238 But reality is not in tension with itself. What ulti-
mately emerges as the engine of tension are those mediating explana-
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